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Abstract
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among
mobile network providers. Market shares and service quality (download speed) are si-
multaneously determined, for demand affects the network load just as delivered quality
affects consumer demand. While consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer
surplus, economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles, push in the other
direction. We find that consumer surplus is maximized at a relatively high number of
firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower-income consumers. Total
surplus, meanwhile, is maximized at a moderate number of firms. Our modeling frame-
work allows us to quantify the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile
telecommunications, finding it is roughly four times an individual firm’s willingness to pay
for a marginal unit of spectrum.
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1 Introduction
Numerous contentious policy questions have arisen recently in the mobile telecommunications
industry related to mergers and spectrum allocation. Common to these debates is the question
of how changes to the market structure impact prices and quality of service.
In this paper, we develop a structural model of the mobile telecommunications industry to
capture the impact of changes in industry structure (such as mergers or changes in spectrum
allocation), on equilibrium outcomes such as prices, investment, quality of service, and welfare.
This allows us to assess the trade-off between market power and economies of scale, both in
the traditional sense, where consolidation may result in higher or lower prices (Williamson,
1968), and in understanding how consolidation affects quality of service, which is endogenously
determined by firms’ investments, spectrum allocation, and the load on the network imposed
by data consumption.1 Our model is also well-suited to addressing questions of spectrum
allocation; we use the model to compute the value of allocating more bandwidth to mobile
telecommunications.
We model the determination of quality of service using an engineering model (Blaszczyszyn,
Jovanovicy and Karray, 2014) with three pieces, each having important economic implications:
path loss, information theory, and queuing theory. Our study thus falls within the tradition
of engineering production functions of Chenery (1949).
Path loss (i.e., the reduction in power of electromagnetic waves as they travel) results in
economies of density: a mobile network operator can serve a densely populated area more
efficiently (meaning either higher download speed at a given cost or the same download speed
at a lower cost) than a sparsely populated area.2 Noting that mergers can effectively increase
the population density served by firms, these economies of density create the potential for
cost or quality synergies associated with mergers.
Queuing theory allows us to understand how the allocation of shared resources leads to
economies of scale, in the spirit of Mulligan (1983). When two merging mobile network op-
erators combine both their customer bases and owned bandwidth, the merged firm can more
efficiently allocate network capacity among customers, leading to higher download speeds.
Information theory, specifically the Shannon-Hartley theorem, tells us how a firm’s channel
1Quality of service has featured prominently in recent merger cases. For instance, the Sprint/T-Mobile
merger was allowed based on the finding “that quality benefits and dynamic competition serve as counter-
vailing forces to the static analysis that substantially address its predicted harmful price effects” (Federal
Communications Commission, 2019).
2For example, suppose that the number of base stations per person is held constant across different pop-
ulation densities, so that less population-dense areas have lower base station density. Because signals in the
sparsely populated areas will have to travel further on average, they will experience greater path loss, and
sparsely populated areas will have inferior service despite receiving the same level of investment per capita.
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capacity (i.e., the maximum rate of data transmission) depends on the bandwidth (amount
of spectrum) operated. By explicitly modeling this dependence, we can understand the im-
pacts of spectrum allocation. For example, we can determine the impact of firms combining
their spectrum holdings through a merger or the impact of regulators modifying the industry
spectrum allocation.
We embed the engineering model of data transmission within an equilibrium model of com-
petition among firms that operate mobile networks. Firms choose prices of various mobile
service plans and the level of investment in infrastructure. Consumers respond in both their
mobile contract choices and their data consumption decisions to prices and the download
speeds.
A challenge for accurately modeling quality of service is the fact that consumer demand for
data and download speeds are simultaneously determined. Consumer demand for a network
operator’s services depends on its quality of service, and its quality of service depends on
consumer demand due to congestion externalities. Most demand models for mobile services
do not model the simultaneous determination of demand and quality of service (including
Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2018), Cullen, Schutz and Shcherbakov (2016), Fan and Yang
(2016), Sinkinson (2020), Sun (2015), Weiergräber (2018)). Only El Azouzi, Altman and
Wynter (2003) and Lhost, Pinto and Sibley (2015) model the simultaneous determination of
service quality and choice of service provider using queuing theory like we do. Our study builds
on these by incorporating path loss (and therefore economies of density) and by estimating
a product-level demand model using detailed consumption and quality data. Meanwhile, in
the engineering literature, Hua, Liu and Panwar (2012) examine how integrating network
resources benefits both from economies of density and pooling, but without an economic
equilibrium framework that endogenizes consumers’ choices and firms’ investments.
We estimate a model of demand for mobile plans and data consumption based on the French
market in 2015. Our estimation relies on a unique data set from the French mobile market. We
obtain data on choices and consumption by nearly 15 million customers in October 2015 from
a single mobile network operator, Orange Mobile.3 We also secure data on quality of mobile
broadband, measured as the actual speed experienced by users. We complement these data
with information on network deployment from the spectrum frequency regulator (ANFR),
and income distribution from the statistical office (INSEE). While we only observe consumers
subscribing to one operator, we observe the prices and characteristics for all contracts available
in the market, and we prove that the estimation strategy of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
can be employed in this setting.4
3In accordance with data protection and privacy concerns, we were provided with commune-level statistics
rather than accessing the detailed consumer-level data directly.
4Our model predicts shares for all products from all providers in the market, but we only require that the
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We use the estimated models of demand and infrastructure to compute counterfactual equi-
libria under different numbers of firms. We find that consumer surplus is maximized at a
relatively high number of firms, but that aggregate consumer surplus masks considerable
heterogeneity across consumers of different income levels. Consumers of different income lev-
els value a marginal increase in download speeds differently, and we find that low income
individuals prefer a market with more firms than do high income individuals.
We also explore the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to the mobile telecom-
munications industry and compare this value with an individual firm’s willingness to pay for
a marginal unit of spectrum.5 We find that the marginal social value is about four times
greater than an individual firm’s willingness to pay.
Our model is also well suited to addressing questions of within-industry spectrum allocation.
Inspired by the entry of Free Mobile in 2012 in France, we consider two ways in which a
regulator might allocate more spectrum to mobile telecommunications: by giving it to a new
entrant (inducing entry), or distributing it among incumbents. We find that the former is
better for consumer surplus (and preferred by most consumers), but the latter is better for
total surplus (and high-income consumers).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data along with
some descriptive statistics on usage and quality of mobile data. Section 3 presents the model
of infrastructural investment, and section 4 lays out the demand and cost models. Section 5
presents the estimation strategy and results. Section 6 presents some counterfactual analyses.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The French telecommunications market hosts four mobile network operators (MNOs): Or-
ange (market share of 37%), SFR (29%), Bouygues (17%), and Free Mobile (17%). 92% of
the population above 12 years old are mobile users according to a survey by CREDOC. Mo-
bile services include voice and data communications as well as short message services (SMS).
Statistics provided by France’s national regulator show that voice and SMS usage had sta-
bilized by 2015, the period we focus on to estimate our model. In contrast, the volume of
data per user was growing rapidly, reaching an average of 800 megabytes (MB) in 2015, up
from 100 MB in 2010 (see Figure 23 in Appendix C.1). The provision of high quality data
services has been a major concern in recent antitrust cases and regulatory discussions. Thus,
modeling data transmission will be a major focus for us.
model rationalize product-level market shares for Orange. For other firms, we impose firm-level demand shocks
and require the model to rationalize firm-level market shares.
5This willingness to pay is the value to which firms’ bids in a simple spectrum auction will be related.
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2.1 Data description
This study relies on data from several sources. A supplementary data appendix (Appendix
C) provides a detailed description of these data sources.
Our main data source is a proprietary data set of 15 million residential mobile customers of
one operator, Orange Mobile, in October 2015. This data set includes information on the
contract subscribed to and the usage of mobile voice and data services. In the remainder
of the paper, we focus on data services because network investment since 2013 has typically
been made in order to improve the quality of data services, and, with the deployment of 4G
technology voice and data services, can draw on the same network resources.
The customer data set is complemented by data on the quality of mobile data services, defined
as download speed. Unlike fixed broadband Internet access, the quality of mobile data is hard
to measure due to congestion and users’ mobility. Congestion arises because the available
bandwidth is shared among users and, as a result, the greater the number of users, the lower
the quality (as measured by download speed). At the same time, the number of users (and
therefore the demand for data) on a network depends on quality. In our counterfactuals, we
will employ a model in which demand and quality of service are simultaneously determined,
but for the purpose of estimation, we rely on a direct measure of download speeds as our
measure of quality. Speedtest is a service offered by the firm Ookla that allows users to check
their download and upload internet speeds. The data include measured download speed,
the time of the speed test, the location of the user, and the mobile network operator. We
use a proprietary data set provided by Ookla on over one million speed tests in France in
the fourth quarter of 2015 to construct a measure of experienced download speeds for each
mobile network operator in each municipality. Section C.4 in the data appendix explains the
construction of this quality measure in detail.
Markets are defined as municipalities (communes), and we limit our analysis to relatively
populous markets, defined as those with a population greater than 10 000, for a total of 589
markets.6 Municipality-level market size is estimated using the population above age 12
(obtained from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE)
together with surveys conducted by CREDOC that provide the share of mobile users in the
population above 12. We also obtain the income distribution by municipality from INSEE.
6We limit ourselves to populous markets because active network sharing (where network operators share
the transmitting components of their infrastructure) is relatively common in rural areas but not practiced in
urban areas. Thus, for our sample, we are comfortable associating a firm’s measured download speeds with
that firm’s own infrastructural investments. Furthermore, antenna coverage is not limited to the boundary of
municipalities, particularly so in rural areas. In order to obtain a reliable measure of quality at the lowest
geographical level, we need to define a market as a municipality. There are 592 municipalities with a population
greater than 10 000, and we drop three of those municipalities due to insufficient download speed tests to
construct quality measures. This yields a total of 589 markets in our sample.
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We collect tariff data from online quarterly catalogs of offers proposed by the four MNOs and
the largest mobile virtual network operator (MVNO). Tariff characteristics include monthly
prices, data allowances, and voice allowances.
Most of the MNOs offer contracts that vary based on characteristics that are beyond the
scope of our model, including bundling with home internet and television services. Because
we want to focus on the choice of mobile data services, we aggregate contracts according to
monthly data allowance categories: less than 500 MB, 500–3 000 MB, 3 000–7 000 MB, and
more than 7 000 MB. These data limits are “soft,” in the sense that customers can still use
data services once the limit is exceeded, but download speeds will be throttled significantly.
Our demand model will take the softness of data limits into account.
For each data limit category, a representative contract is selected, and for the purposes of
our demand estimation, we assume that all consumers selecting a product within a category
are selecting the representative product for that category. Table 1 presents the representative
contracts, which in most cases have 24-month commitment durations and are not bundled
with home internet or television services. Representative products typically have unlimited
voice allowances, except for the lowest data limit categories. For MVNO’s, our choice set
includes one representative contract for each category; that is, we effectively assume there is
one representative MVNO firm. Appendix C.5 describes in detail how we select representative
contracts.
To be clear, the representative products in our model’s choice set have the characteristics of
products actually available in the market. The only characteristic that is adjusted from what
is actually observed in the market is the monthly price; when a representative contract is
associated with a handset subsidy, the monthly price is adjusted to reflect the value of that
handset subsidy (see the data appendix for details). Each actual product is then assigned to
a representative product, and our estimation takes the market shares of the representative
products to be the aggregate market share of all the actual products assigned to that repre-
sentative product. For instance, our econometric model features one high-data-limit contract
for Orange. We treat the price of this product as 38.74 euros. This price corresponds to
an observed price of 54.99 euros for this contract and an adjustment of 16.25 euros for the
value of the associated handset subsidy. We measure the market share of this representative
product, however, as the sum of market shares of eleven high-data-limit contracts offered by
Orange that are associated with various home internet and television bundles.
Finally, we obtain detailed data on infrastructure from the national radio communications
regulator (ANFR). These data describe the locations of all base stations with the number of
antennas and frequencies operated by firm.
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Table 1: The Choice Set
Operator Price Data Unlimited Contracts Min Max Min Max
Limit Voice Represented Price Price Limit Limit
Orange 12.07 50 No 11 4.99 30.99 0 50
Orange 14.99 1000 No 4 14.99 14.99 1000 1000
Orange 22.91 1000 Yes 2 22.91 24.99 1000 1000
Orange 30.91 4000 Yes 5 19.99 48.99 3000 5000
Orange 38.74 8000 Yes 11 38.74 166.0 8000 20000
Bouygues 8.070 0 No 6 3.99 11.32 0 20
Bouygues 14.99 1000 No 3 14.99 14.99 1000 1000
Bouygues 20.91 3000 Yes 4 19.99 29.99 3000 5000
Bouygues 33.74 10000 Yes 4 32.70 72.70 10000 20000
Free Mobile 2 50 No 1 2.00 2.00 50 50
Free Mobile 19.99 3000 Yes 1 19.99 19.99 3000 3000
SFR 12.07 100 No 5 5.990 14.99 100 200
SFR 14.99 1000 No 3 14.99 19.99 1000 1000
SFR 22.91 1000 Yes 3 22.91 29.99 1000 1000
SFR 31.91 5000 Yes 5 19.99 43.99 3000 5000
SFR 37.74 10000 Yes 9 36.70 150.0 10000 20000
MVNO 7.990 No 0 13 7.990 18.99 0 200
MVNO 17.99 1000 No 5 9.990 17.99 500 1000
MVNO 19.99 500 Yes 10 19.99 35.99 500 2000
MVNO 42.99 5000 Yes 13 12.99 61.99 3000 5000
MVNO 64.99 10000 Yes 4 64.99 76.99 10000 10000
Each row corresponds to an object in the choice set, i.e., a representative product. The minimum and
maximum prices and data limits are over the set of contracts represented by each representative product
in the choice set.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Customer data (Orange)
Market Average Usage (MB) 1 043 194 554 1701
Fraction Users above Data Limit 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.28
Num. customers 4 425 831
Quality and market data
Quality Orange (Mbps) 33.02 11.35 3.97 89.87
Quality Bouygues (Mbps) 23.73 9.69 0.60 72.97
Quality Free (Mbps) 23.21 11.08 1.56 57.26
Quality SFR (Mbps) 17.60 8.60 0.39 52.30
Quality MVNO (Mbps) 24.79 7.12 5.13 49.06
Median income (Euros) 13 035 3 179 5 152 31 320
Number of markets 589
Tariff data
Price 23.47 14.57 2.00 64.99
Price (Orange) 23.92 11.06 12.07 38.74
Price (Others) 23.33 15.83 2.00 64.99
Data limit 3 081 3 570 0 10 000
Num. products 21
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main variables of interest from the data sets
described in the previous section.
Measured quality (download speeds) varies substantially both across and within markets.
Across markets, the average standard deviation for an operator is 9.56 Mbps, and across
operators, the average standard deviation for a market is 7.92 Mbps. Figure 1 displays
histograms of measured quality across markets for each mobile network operator. Data usage
is positively correlated with measured quality. Figure 2 plots the relationship between Orange
market qualities and observed average data usage for three different data limits.7 The average
fraction of the data limit that is consumed is decreasing in the size of the data limit, as
demonstrated in figure 3, which plots the histograms of average data consumption for three
different data limits.8
7The correlations for data limits 1 000 MB, 4 000 MB, and 8 000 MB are, respectively, 0.147, 0.271, 0.246.
8For the data limits 1 000 MB, 4 000 MB, and 8 000 MB, the fraction of the data limit that is consumed is,
respectively, on average, 0.656, 0.578, and 0.533.
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Figure 2: Average data usage vs. measured quality across markets
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Figure 3: Average data usage across markets
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Median incomes are correlated with products market shares. Figure 4 plots the relationship
between median income and market shares of the three most expensive contracts offered by
Orange, which correspond to the same three contracts depicted in figures 2 and 3. Median
incomes are positively correlated with the market shares of the most expensive contracts.9
Figure 4: Median income vs. expensive contract market shares
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9Correlation coefficients for median incomes and market shares are, following the order of the graphs, 0.441,
0.519, 0.278.
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Figure 5: Median income vs. mean data consumption
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3 Industry Model
In this section, we describe a formal model of how download speeds are jointly determined
by bandwidth allocations, infrastructure investment decisions, and the load imposed on a
network by consumers. We rely on standard telecommunications engineering models and
are particularly indebted to Blaszczyszyn, Jovanovicy and Karray (2014). Table 22 in the
appendix provides a list of all parameters used in the industry and demand models and their
definitions.
In this model, firms own and operate their own networks with no sharing of infrastructure.
In practice, network sharing occurs when an MNO dedicates a part of its network resources
to another MNO. Passive network sharing involves the physical structure of base stations
and the cost of electric power, but not the resources that transmit and receive signals and
affect quality determination. In contrast, active network sharing occurs when equipment that
transmits data is shared. During 2015, active network sharing occurred primarily in areas
with low population density. Because we want to associate each firm’s quality of service with
the firm’s own investment decisions, we ultimately focus on the higher-density areas of France
in our demand analysis.
3.1 Base station infrastructure and data transmission
We begin by deriving engineering relationships that apply to each firm’s network. For now,
we omit firm subscripts and consider the engineering relationships in the abstract. Let B be
the bandwidth being operated by a network of identical base stations serving distinct and
identical cells. Let R be the cell radius in this network; later, we will think of cell radius as
11
the choice variable in a firm’s infrastructural investment decision.10
For a given consumer i, the theoretical maximum download speed q (ri) achieved by a unit
of bandwidth depends on the consumer’s distance ri from the base station. Download speeds
scale linearly with bandwidth, so if a consumer is allocated bi units of bandwidth, their
theoretical maximum download speed will be biq (ri). We will elaborate on the q (·) function
below.
To aggregate download speeds over consumers, it would not be correct to compute the ordinary
mean of q (r) because users who receive lower quality signal require more resources for a given
download; that is, for a download of a given size, they will either tie up the base station’s
capacity for longer or they will require a relatively larger fraction of the bandwidth to receive
the same download speed as consumers closer to the antenna. Consequently, average download
speeds should be derived from harmonic means.
For the sake of exposition, begin by imagining that a unit mass of users, each of whom with
one unit of demand for data, are guaranteed the same download speed, Q̄, and for now we
ignore queuing issues and assume constant aggregate demand. Then, a user at distance r will
require bandwidth Q̄/q (r). Assuming users are uniformly distributed over the cell, the total
bandwidth required to serve the cell is




q (r)g (r) dr,
where R is the radius of the cell, and g (r) and G (R) reflect its geometry (e.g., g (r) = 2πr and
G (R) = πR2 with circular cells, but we use hexagonal cells, which tessellate).11 Rearranging
the above equation to solve for the average download speed that can be sustained by a given
bandwidth, we have







This equation expresses channel capacity, describing how feasible download speeds are influ-
enced by the firm’s choice of cell radius R and its bandwidth B.12 We have assumed there is
a unit density of users. If the density of users is D, then the channel capacity per consumer
would be equal to Q̄ (R,B) /D. Intuitively, feasible download speeds depend on the level
10In principle, firms could also choose signal strength, which would also affect data download speeds, but
firms typically operate at the maximum signal strength allowed by regulation.




2, where R is the hexagon’s side length. When we actually
integrate over hexagonal cells, we do not actually use a formula for g(r). Instead, we compute a double integral,
integrating over the hexagon’s apothem and perpendicular to the apothem.
12We need not assume that everybody gets the same download speed to derive this formula for channel
capacity. We could also suppose everybody is allocated the same bandwidth in which case a consumer at
distance r’s time spent downloading is proportional to the inverse of Bq (r). Then, total data downloaded
12
of demand. Below, we will consider more precisely how demand affects delivered download
speed using queuing theory. We will also consider how the demand level depends on delivered
download speed, since consumers presumably are more likely to subscribe to a firm and down-
load more data when a firm offers better download speeds. Thus, in equilibrium, demand and
download speeds are simultaneously determined.
Next, we consider the individual download speed function q (·). The Shannon-Hartley theorem
tells us that the theoretical upper bound to download speed (per unit of bandwidth) is given
by:
q (r) = log2 (1 + SINR (r)) (2)
where SINR (r) is the signal-to-noise-and-interference ratio. This ratio is given by the ratio
of signal power to the sum of noise and interference power:
SINR (r) = S (r)
N + I , (3)
where S (r) is signal power, N is noise power, and I is interference power. We now consider
each of these three objects in turn.
As the signal travels, its power diminishes (path loss). We take this into account by using the
Hata model of path loss. Ultimately, we assume that the signal power is equal to
lnS (r) = −18.012− 3.522 ln (r) . (4)
Notice that this entails a path loss exponent of approximately 3.522.13 In contrast, signal
strength in a vacuum would have a path loss exponent of 2, but signals decay more quickly
on the Earth’s surface.14
Noise power N is set equal to Johnson-Nyquist noise, −107.01 dBm per 5 MHz of bandwidth.
Interference power is set equal to 30% of the signal power from the six adjacent cells.15 The














or the same formula for channel capacity as (1).
13Most engineering studies use a path loss exponent between 3.5 and 4.
14The specific values in our path loss equation can be derived as follows. We begin with the Hata model
for urban environments, and we assume a base station height of 30m. We assume the signal frequency of 1900
Mhz, which is approximately the median operated frequency in France in 2015. Finally, we assume a signal
power of 61 dBm (or 1259 W) per 5 Mhz of bandwidth at the base station, which corresponds to the regulated
limit on effective isotropic radiated power.
15When we perform the integration above, we compute each point’s distance from the centroids of the six
adjacent cells to calculate interference power. See Appendix A.1 for a more detailed description.
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30% number follows Blaszczyszyn, Jovanovicy and Karray (2014) and reflects that adjacent
cells won’t always be in use, and modern systems use directional signals to limit interference.
3.2 Queuing
Consumers’ download requests do not arrive uniformly over time. This means that Q derived
above will not represent the actual delivered download speed in practice but a theoretical
upper bound referred to as channel capacity.
To derive a relationship between channel capacity and average delivered download speed,
we follow Blaszczyszyn, Jovanovicy and Karray (2014) and assume that download requests
arrive according to a Poisson process and that download requests are served through a M/M/1
queue. Then, the average download speed will be
Q = Q−QD, (5)
where QD is the arrival rate of download requests. Each of the terms in equation 5 should be
understood as rates, e.g., as values measured in Megabits per second.16
3.3 Transmission equilibrium
We now consider how the engineering relationships described above come together with de-
mand to determine delivered download speeds in equilibrium. To be clear, at this point we are
considering equilibrium in terms of download speeds and consumer demand, taking prices and
infrastructure as given. This can be thought of as a final-stage equilibrium. Below, we will
consider how prices are set in anticipation of this transmission equilibrium and subsequently
how infrastructure is determined in anticipation of price and transmission equilibria.
Formally, the equilibrium we now consider is conditional on a vector of prices P and in-
frastructure variables (R,B). If each firm offers only one contract, and if price is the only
contractual choice variable, then P is a F -dimensional vector, where F is the number of firms.
Ultimately, we will consider multi-product firms and other contractual variables besides price
(i.e., data limits), in which case P can represent a higher-dimensional vector including prices
and non-price characteristics of all products. In either case, R and B are both F -dimensional
vectors – each firm employs only one network to serve all its products with. The f -subscripts
will denote firm-specific variables.
The demand for downloads on firm f ’s network can be broken down into the product of three
16For a derivation of this formula, see Taylor, Karlin and Taylor (1998), pp. 548-549, for example.
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terms:
QDf (Qf ,Pf ,Q−f ,P−f ) = D × Sf (Qf ,Pf ,Q−f ,P−f )× x̄f (Qf ,Pf ,Q−f ,P−f ) ,
where D is the density of consumers, Sf (·) represents firm f ’s total market share as a func-
tion of the average download speeds for each firm and prices for each product, and x̄f (·)
represents the average data consumption among firm f ’s subscribers. The market share and
average download speed functions will be derived from a discrete-continuous model of demand,
specified in the following section, in which consumers choose which product to subscribe to
and how much data to consume.
Combining equations (1) and (5), we have








−QDf (Qf ,Pf ,Q−f ,P−f ) . (6)
If prices and the infrastructure variables are given, then we have F equations and F download
speeds Qf to solve for, so, under appropriate conditions on the demand system, the above
equation uniquely defines a vector of equilibrium download speeds Q∗.
We have now defined the transmission equilibrium as a function of prices and infrastructure,
Q∗ (P,R,B). Subsequently, we will consider the price equilibrium as a function of infrastruc-
ture, P∗ (R,B), and then finally the equilibrium in infrastructural investment.
3.4 Price competition
We can understand the network equilibrium model above as holding at the market level m
with potentially different infrastructural variables in each market, (Rm,Bm). However, prices
are set nationally, so we will not introduce subscripts on the price vectors. From now on, when
the infrastructure variables appear without market subscripts, they refer to the stacked vector
of infrastructure variables for all markets.
Each firm f sets prices to maximize its variable profits. We define
P∗f (R,B) = arg max
P f
{








where cu is the variable cost per customer, Nm is the size of market m, and S∗mf denotes a
vector of product-level shares for products owned by firm f . The market share function is
derived from the demand system and the transmission equilibrium function as follows:
S∗mf (P,Rm,Bm) = Smf
(




where the Smf (Qmf ,Pf ,Qm,−f ,P−f ) function stacks firm f ’s product-level market shares as
a function of prices and download speeds. The market share function has an m-subscript to
allow for variation in local demographics.
Note that equilibrium download speeds depend on price, so the first-order condition for op-
timal price-setting must not only take into account the direct effect of lowering price on
consumer demand, but also the indirect effect of endogenous download speeds. The indirect
effect lowers price elasticities because as demand for firm f falls, f ’s download speeds increase
due to reduced network load, which has a positive effect on demand, thereby dampening the
demand reduction. We discuss demand elasticities further in section 6.
3.5 Infrastructure competition
The first stage of competition involves firms deciding on their infrastructural investments in
each market. Infrastructure costs in market m are given by the following function:




where Am is the land area of market m and cfc,m captures fixed costs per base station (which
may vary by market).
Next, we can define market-level profits as follows:
Πmf (P ,Rm,Bm) = (P f − cu,f ) ·
∑
m
NmSmf (P ,Rm,Bm)− Cmf (Rmf , Bmf ) . (9)




Πmf (P ∗ (R,B) ,Rm,Bm) , (10)
where P ∗ (R,B) is the solution to the national pricing game defined above.
Equation (10), taken for each firm f , defines the payoffs for the first-stage game in infrastruc-
tural investment. Each firm f chooses (Rf ,Bf ) to maximize national profits, taking others




In this section, we have considered market shares and data demand as abstract functions of
delivered download speeds and prices. In the following section, we will be explicit about the
model of consumer behavior. Following that, we will consider the estimation of the demand
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model and the cost parameters (cu, cfc).
3.6 Economies of Scale
A merger between two firms in this model will exhibit cost efficiencies if, post merger, the
merged firm is able to provide the same quality at a lower cost or higher quality at the same
cost. Our model allows for efficiencies that result from economies of density and economies
of pooling.
3.6.1 Economies of Pooling
It has long been recognized in the economics literature that “there are economies of scale
in servicing a stochastic market” (Carlton, 1978).17 In operations management, the same
phenomenon has been referred to as the “Pooling Principle” (Cattani and Schmidt, 2005).
Thus, we use “economies of pooling” to describe economies of scale coming from consolidating
bandwidth.
It is easy to see how economies of scale result from our queuing theory model. Equation (5)
holds that delivered download speed corresponds to the difference between channel capacity
and the download demand rate. Crucially, channel capacity is linear in bandwidth. Thus, if
two identical firms combine their bandwidth and their customer bases (holding the download
demand rate per customer fixed), then both terms on the right-hand side of equation (5)
would double. Consequently, download speeds (the left-hand side) would also double.
3.6.2 Economies of Density
Due to path loss, captured by the function q(·), the closer users are to a base station, the
more efficiently that station can serve them. Thus, if we increase the density of users served
by a firm while keeping constant the numbers of users per base station, users will be closer to
base stations serving them on average, improving download speeds. If two network operators
were to merge and combine their user bases, the merged entity would effectively serve a higher
population density of users. This creates the opportunity for the merged firm to deliver higher
download speeds to its customers with the same total investment level of the pre-merger firms,
which we refer to as “economies of density.”18
17Robinson (1948) was perhaps the first to describe the phenomenon, under the heading of “the economy
of the large machine.” De Vany (1976) was an early application using queuing theory to derive economies of
scale. Mulligan (1983) shows formally how economies of scale result from queuing theory.
18Here we ignore the dynamics of merging two firms and integrating their existing infrastructure; we are
making statements about what would happen with a given level of investment spread across two firms in
comparison to what one integrated firm would achieve with the same level of total investment.
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4 Demand Model
Notation Individuals are indexed by i, the various contracts are denoted by j ∈ J =
{1, . . . , J}, and geographic markets are indexed by m ∈M = {1, . . . ,M}. Quality of service,
measured as average download speed, is captured by Qm,f , where f denotes a firm. Quality
is constant across j ∈ Jf in commune m, where Jf represents the set of products produced
by firm f . We write f (j) to denote the firm associated with product j.
We consider the consumer’s static consumption decision. A consumer’s indirect utility from
a contract j, consuming x megabytes of data, in market m, is denoted by




+ θvvj − θpipj + ξjm + εij , (11)
where pj is the contract price; uj(·) maps the contract j, data consumption x, and data
quality Qm,f(j) into the utility from consumption of mobile services; vj is a dummy variable
equal to one if plan j has an unlimited voice allowance; ξjm is the product-market-specific
demand shock; and θ and ϑ are parameters describing preferences. Idiosyncratic tastes εij
are realized before the choice of contract j is made. The preference parameter ϑi is a random
variable capturing how much agent i values data; it is realized after the choice of contract is
made, but an agent chooses the contract with knowledge of its distribution. The object is to
estimate the distribution of preference parameters θi and ϑi.
Consumer Behavior To maximize utility, the consumer chooses a plan j and data usage
x. We first consider what the agent’s usage behavior would be, conditional on contract.
Usage behavior depends on the consumer’s ϑi, which is a random variable, reflecting that
consumers may be unable to perfectly forecast their utility for data when choosing a phone
contract. We then consider the optimal choice of contract, which consumers choose after
forming expectations over uj(·;ϑi, θi).
Mobile Data Consumption To rationalize finite data consumption even when additional
data consumption entails no monetary cost, our functional form includes a term which cor-
responds to the disutility of download times. This disutility is proportional to the amount
of data downloaded and inversely proportional to the download speed; it can be thought of
as the opportunity cost of time spent downloading. Consumers will consume data until the
marginal utility of extra data corresponds to the disutility of additional download time.
A consumer’s utility of data consumption is given by the following functional form:
uj (x,Q;ϑi, θi) = ϑi log (1 + x)− θccj (x,Q) , (12)
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if x > x̄j ,
(13)
There is a discontinuity in download speeds when a consumer reaches their monthly data limit,
x̄j . Data consumed after reaching the data limit downloads at the throttled speed QL  Q,
where Q is stacked firm-market-specific download speeds. This creates a discontinuity in the
marginal cost of data consumption. Let
x∗j (Q;ϑi, θc) ≡ arg max
x∈R+
{uj (x,Q;ϑi, θi)}
be the data choice that maximizes data utility for contract j. The first order condition and the
structure of the marginal cost of data consumption yield four possible cases that determine







0 if ϑi ≤ θcQf(j)
ϑiQf(j)
θc











− 1 if ϑi ≥ θcQL (x̄j + 1) .
(14)
The first case captures consumer types ϑi that would not consume any data.20 The second
case captures consumer types that consume less than x̄j even without throttling. The third
case captures consumer types that would consume greater than x̄j if data speeds were not
throttled, but under throttling, the marginal cost of an additional unit of data is greater than
the marginal benefit, so they choose to consume exactly the data limit. Finally, the fourth
case captures consumer types that would consume greater than x̄j even under throttled data
speeds.21
Contract Decision The consumer chooses the contract that maximizes her expected utility.
The expectation is with respect to the data consumption utility parameter ϑi, which we will
assume is distributed
ϑi ∼ Exponential (θdi) .
19We are using here the assumption that QL  Q, which holds in our data.
20We interpret such consumers as those that unexpectedly do not need their mobile plan (e.g., they went
out of the country for the month). Indeed, in our data, we observe a point mass of consumers that consume
zero data—even among those that adopt high data limit plans.
21Small data limit plans have hard data limits (i.e., there is no throttling). We therefore impose that all
contracts with data limits less than 500 MB cannot consume greater than the associated data limit.
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While the consumer does not know her ϑi ex ante, she does know her θdi, which we allow to
vary by i. Each market has an outside option, j = 0, which has indirect utility normalized
to εi0. We estimate a random coefficient nested logit model, nesting out the outside option.
Specifically,
εij = ζig + (1− σ) ηij ,
where ηij is i.i.d. extreme value and ζig has the distribution such that εij is extreme value.
The value σ ∈ [0, 1) is the nesting parameter, and all contracts (but not the outside option)
belong to a single nest.22 The addition of a nest for all contracts allows for more flexible
substitution patterns to the outside option.
The consumer observes θi, as well as εij , but must choose a contract before observing the ϑi.
Thus,











; θi, ϑi, εij
)]}
,
where the expectation is taken over ϑi conditional on θdi.
See Appendix A.3 for an analytic expression of expected utility from data conditional on
contract and θi.
5 Estimation
We estimate the demand model using a modified version of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),
described below. After estimating demand, we infer firm’s costs based on the assumption that
firms set prices and invest in quality optimally.
5.1 Demand estimation
We seek to estimate the distribution of consumer parameters θi. Specifically, we have the
following parameters
θi = [θpi, θc, θdi, θv]′ .
















where zi is the consumer’s income. The specifications for θpi and θdi are with respect to the
log parameters in order to ensure the correct sign: for all income levels, the price coefficient
must be negative and the rate parameter must be positive.
22Note that if σ = 0, the model is equivalent to a random coefficients model without nesting.
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5.1.1 Unobserved demand component
As is standard in the demand estimation literature, we use market shares to back out the
unobserved demand components ξ. The standard BLP contraction mapping used to solve
for ξ does not apply in our setting, however. We observe the set of products offered by all
firms, but we only observe detailed market share data for Orange. Specifically, we observe
market shares for each of Orange’s products for each market m, but we only observe firm-level
national market shares for the other firms.
Our modified estimation technique rationalizes product-level market shares for Orange prod-
ucts and only the firm-level aggregate market shares for the other firms. Formally, we assume
∀j ∈ J−O,∀m : ξjm = ξf(j),
where J−O is the set of non-Orange products, and f(j) is the firm that corresponds to product
j. Appendix A.2 shows that a modified version of the BLP contraction mapping still applies
in our context that is capable of solving for the unique vector ξ under the above assumption.
5.1.2 Elasticity imputations
Prices are set nation-wide and do not vary by market. Moreover, prices varied very little
over time around our sample period.23 See Figure 6 for prices over the two years prior to
our sample period. Prices of Orange contracts are in blue, and the prices of other operator
contracts are in light gray. Given the lack of price variation, it is difficult to identify price
elasticities from the data.
23Note that Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2018) consider a time period that includes the entry of Free Mobile
in 2012. Following this entry, there were substantial price changes as the incumbent MNOs reacted to the new
low-cost competitor. In contrast, during the two years leading up to our sample period, price variation was
quite limited.
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We therefore take an approach where we impute price elasticities over a wide range of possible
elasticities. For each elasticity considered, we impose that the price elasticity of Orange
products corresponds to the imposed elasticity. Formally, we calculate the implied Orange
products price elasticity in market m, defined as follows:
eOm(θ) =
sm,O(1.01pO,p−O,Qm; θ)− sm,O(pO,p−O,Qm; θ)
0.01sm,O(pO,p−O,Qm; θ)
,





sijm(pO,p−O,Qm; θi)dFm (θi) ,
and sijm(·) gives the share of consumers of type θi in market m who purchase contract j,
and Fm (θi) denotes the CDF of consumer types θi in market m. The vector pO represents
the vector of Orange product prices, and p−O represents the prices of those produced by
non-Orange firms.






as a moment in our estimation procedure, described below.
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5.1.3 Identification
For each Orange contract, we observe monthly data consumption. We identify the data utility
parameters θd0, θdz, and θc, in part, by matching predicted data consumption with observed
data consumption. Formally, from the data we construct x̄jm, which is the average data
consumption across consumers using product j in market m. Given θ, we can construct the
mean data consumption across consumers in market m that chose product j:
x̄jm(θ) ≡ (sjm(p,Qm; θ))−1
∫ ∫
sijm(p,Qm; θi)x∗jm(ϑi)dF (ϑi|θi) dFm (θi) .
Appendix A.3 shows how to integrate over ϑi analytically.
Matching observed and predicted data consumption effectively identifies the average θdi. To
identify both θd0 and θdz, which controls how θdi varies with income, we use a moment inter-
acting the difference between predicted and observed data consumption and median market
income.
Simply matching mean data consumption and shares consuming above limits does not identify
the level of the data utility (and therefore θc). The level of data utility comes from the trade-
off between the data utility and the contract’s other components (price and voice allowance),
which is identified by imposing that demand shocks ξ are uncorrelated with data limits (which
are correlated with data utility).
The imputed elasticity moment effectively identifies the average θpi, and we separately identify
θp0 and θpz by imposing that the demand shocks ξ are uncorrelated with median incomes.
Voice allowances are assumed to be uncorrelated with the demand shocks.
In summary, we have the following moments that we use to identify the distribution of pref-
erence parameters θ. Note that the moments are only imposed for Orange products since we


















E [ξjm(θ)vj ] = 0
E [ξjm(θ)x̄j ] = 0
We use two-stage efficient GMM to estimate θ, searching for θ in an outer loop and solving
for ξ(θ), eO(θ), and x̄(θ) in an inner loop. Further details can be found in Appendix A.4.
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5.2 Results
Demand parameter estimates are listed in table 3 in Appendix B.1 for a range of imputed
price elasticities and imputed nesting parameters. The price elasticity implied by Bourreau,
Sun and Verboven (2018) is -2.5, the middle imputed price elasticity, which we regard as our
preferred specification. For all imputations, price sensitivity is decreasing in income. The
data utility parameter is increasing in income, which implies an inverse relationship between
income and the value of data consumption, suggesting a higher opportunity cost of time spent
downloading for higher income individuals. The variance parameter is increasing in income.
While signs are consistent across elasticities, the parameter estimates appear to be sensitive to
the price elasticity chosen, especially price, voice allowance, and Orange dummy coefficients.
To interpret the results above, tables 4–6 in Appendix B.1 convert the parameter estimates
into willingness to pay for certain contract characteristics across income percentiles. Figure
7 considers how well our model predicts actual data consumption by plotting predicted and
actual average data consumption across markets for three Orange contracts with different
data limits.24 The diagonal line is a 45-degree line. Markets in which predicted average
consumption equals observed average consumption will lie upon the line. Our estimated model
correctly predicts the average level, even though this level is not a constant fraction of the data
limit. While it predicts across-market heterogeneity less well, it does weakly predict high data
consumption for markets with high observed data consumption and low data consumption for
markets with low observed data consumption. The correlation coefficients between actual and
predicted consumption for the three contracts across markets are, respectively, 0.305, 0.386,
and 0.405.
Figure 7: Predicted vs. actual average data consumption
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x = 8 000
24The predicted average data consumption is based on parameter estimates for the imputed elasticity -2.5
and a nesting parameter of 0.8.
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5.3 Cost Estimation
There are two costs parameters to be estimated: cu, the cost per user and cfc,m, the fixed
cost per base station in market m.
5.3.1 Costs per user
From equation (7), the first-order condition from the price setting game is
∑
m





(P f − cu,f ) = 0, (16)
where Jf represents the Jacobian operator with respect to P f .
Therefore, an estimate of marginal cost is given by






NmSmf (P ,Rm,Bm) .
Estimated costs for our elasticity and nesting parameter imputations are given in Table 7 in
Appendix B.2.
5.3.2 Infrastructure costs
Given the demand estimates, and the model of how the infrastructure variables (R,B) map
into delivered quality, we can simulate how equilibrium revenues change as the infrastructure
is changed. Intuitively, we can measure the marginal revenue of infrastructure, and this allows
us to infer the marginal cost of infrastructure.
Formally, we compute the marginal operating income from each market based on a 1% change
in cell radius:
MRmf,R (Rm,Bm) =
Πmf (P , (.01 +Rmf ,Rm,−f ) ,Bm)−Πmf (P ,Rm,Bm)
.01 .
For these calculations, we use the prices observed in equilibrium, implicitly assuming that the
equilibrium prices (which are set nationally) will not respond to a change in infrastructure
in a single market m. As each commune is quite small, this is a plausible approximation.
Note that these profit functions are defined in terms of the equilibrium download speeds that
result from the infrastructure and prices. Thus, the above expressions for marginal revenue
should be understood as implicitly taking into account how quality changes as infrastructural
investment is changed.
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Next, assuming that infrastructure investments are chosen to maximize profits, we can use
the marginal revenues above to recover the remaining cost function parameters using equation
(8). The marginal cost of increasing Rmf is obtained by differentiating the cost function in
equation (8). Therefore, setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, we can set the
derivative of (8) equal to the marginal revenue with respect to R. This allows us to identify
cost function parameters.
Estimated infrastructure costs for our elasticity and nesting parameter imputations are given
in Table 8 in Appendix B.2.
6 Counterfactual Simulations
Our framework can address questions of market structure, both in terms of traditional an-
titrust questions and questions related to the management of the electromagnetic spectrum.
In section 6.1, we consider the optimal number of firms and the trade-off between market
power and scale economies. Then, in section 6.2, we consider the marginal value of spectrum
allocated to mobile telecommunications and find that the marginal contribution to consumer
surplus far exceeds firms’ willingness to pay. Finally, in section 6.3 we consider two different
ways of allocating new spectrum in the industry: sponsoring the entry of a new firm, or
allocating it among existing firms.
6.1 Market Power and Scale Efficiencies
In this section, we explore the trade-off between market power and economies of scale by
considering the optimal number of firms in a static equilibrium. Given the gradual nature
of network deployment in the industry, this exercise cannot hope to capture the short-run
impacts of potential merger; instead, we aim to capture the long-run trade-offs associated
with consolidation.
We simulate counterfactual equilibria using the estimated cost and demand parameters, as-
suming symmetric firms. Each firm offers two data plans: one with a 1 GB limit and another
with a 10 GB limit. The former represents a small to moderate data allowance; the latter, an
extremely generous data allowance (in 2015). All plans are assumed to have unlimited voice.
As we vary the number of firms, total bandwidth available to the industry is divided equally
among firms. We compute equilibria based on a representative municipality with median
characteristics across municipalities in our sample. We present results below for a nesting
parameters of 0.8, and a price elasticity of -2.5, which is approximately the price elasticity
implied by the demand model of Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2018). Results for other
possible nesting parameters are located in Appendix B.3, and it does not appear that the
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choice of nesting parameter affects our results in a substantial way.
Figure 8 displays endogenous variables for symmetric equilibria as we vary the number of
firms.
Figure 8: Counterfactual prices and qualities
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Equilibrium prices have a subtly non-standard relationship with the number of firms. At
low numbers of firms, prices do decline with the number of firms, but as we get beyond a
few firms, prices can actually increase (seen in Figure 8 for the 10GB data limit product).
The reason for this non-standard relationship has to do with the non-standard nature of
price elasticities in our setting. Figure 9 displays partial price elasticities, the price elasticity
holding quality of service fixed, evaluated at equilibrium prices. These elasticities display the
typical relationship with the number of firms. However, this partial price elasticity is not the
relevant price elasticity for firms’ price setting.
As a firm lowers its price, it attracts more customers, causing the load on its network to
increase, lowering download speeds, and dampening the appeal of the lowered price for con-
sumers. In other words, the relevant elasticity for the purposes of setting optimal prices
involves a full derivative that takes into account the indirect effect of changing prices on
download speeds. Figure 9 also displays these full price elasticites, which decline less with
the number of firms than the partial elasticities. The reason for the divergence between the
full and partial price elasticities is the worsening of the indirect quality effect as the number
of firms grows. When there are many firms, a firm’s own capacity is small relative to the
number of consumers that they can potentially attract from other firms, making quality of
service degrade more for a given price increase.
Investment patterns display a non-monotonic relationship in the number of firms. For a small
number of firms, the number of base stations each firm builds is increasing in the number
of the firms (alternatively, the cell radius characterizing each base station is decreasing).
Increasing the number of firms beyond 2, however, decreases investment at the firm level: for
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each increase in the number of firms, each firm builds fewer base stations (increases the cell
radius). Despite this non-monotonicity in investment, download speeds are always decreasing
in the number of firms. Comparing the monopoly case to the duopoly one, despite fewer base
stations for the monopolist, the economies of pooling and density result in higher download
speeds.
Figure 9: Full and partial price elasticities




















Notes: Partial elasticities are derivatives in which download speeds are held fixed. Full elasticities take
into account how download speeds change endogenously as prices are changed. Price elasticities are
evaluated at the equilibrium prices and quantities.
Figure 10 considers welfare compared to the monopoly case as the number of firms is varied.
For our preferred demand specification (elasticity of -2.5 and nesting parameter of 0.8), the
optimal number of firms is four in terms of total surplus, and six in terms of consumer surplus.
Figure 10: Counterfactual welfare


























Notes: Welfare is measured in euros per capita relative to monopoly.
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However, as Figure 11 illustrates, consumers do not agree on the optimal number of firms.
We plot welfare for various income deciles against the number of firms for our preferred
specification. While consumer surplus is increasing in the number of firms for most consumers
(at least up to six firms), the optimal number of firms for high-income consumers is three. In
all our simulations, we have observed that the optimal number of firms is (weakly) decreasing
with income.
Figure 11: Counterfactual welfare by income level



















































Notes: Welfare is measured in euros per capita relative to monopoly.
6.2 Allocating Spectrum to the Industry
Regulators such as the FCC in the US and ARCEP and ANFR in France are tasked with
bandwidth allocation, determining which industries (and firms) are allowed to operate which
frequencies of electromagnetic spectrum and for what purposes. It is therefore crucial for
such agencies to understand how allocating bandwidth to mobile telecommunications will
affect social welfare.25
In this section, we quantify how allocating more bandwidth to the telecommunications indus-
try affects firm profits, consumer welfare, and total surplus.
First, let’s consider how a firm’s profits change when just that firm receives a larger bandwidth
allocation. The derivative
∂Πf (R∗ (bf ,b−f ) , (bf ,b−f ))
∂bf
(17)
captures an individual firm’s willingness to pay for more bandwidth at the margin.
Next,
∂Πf (R∗ (b1) , b1)
∂b
(18)
captures how the equilibrium profits of an individual firm changes when all firms are allocated
25The FCC’s mandate is explicitly in “the public interest.” To allocate spectrum optimally among different
industries – or to allocate the optimal among of spectrum to mobile telecommunications – one would need to
quantify the social opportunity cost of spectrum, which is beyond our scope.
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more bandwidth.
Finally, we can consider how consumer surplus changes as all firms are allocated more band-
width
∂CSf (R∗ (b1) , b1)
∂b
. (19)
In a simple spectrum auction, the firms’ bids will be related to (17). However, the regulator’s
spectrum decision should be based on comparing (18) and (19) to the marginal social value
to allocation spectrum to other industries and purposes.
Figure 12: Bandwidth derivatives











































































Notes: Derivatives are evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium values.
As Figure 12 shows, with four firms, the firm’s willingness to pay for additional bandwidth
(the left panel) is about four times less than a unit of bandwidth allocated to the industry
would add to consumer surplus (the right panel). This reflects the importance of using a
structural model such as ours to quantify the social value of bandwith. While auctions may
allow us to observe signals of operators’ willingness to pay for spectrum, such measures may
be far lower than the social value of spectrum.
6.3 Allocating Spectrum within the Industry
Spectrum allocation questions go well beyond the question of how much spectrum to allocate
to each industry. In particular, how should spectrum be allocated among firms? In this
section, we consider two ways of allocating new spectrum to the mobile telecommunications
industry. First, the regulator could distribute the new spectrum among existing operators.
Alternatively, it could sponsor the entry of a new operator, as happened in France with Free
Mobile, which received regulatory approval to become France’s fourth MNO in 2009, and
launched in 2012.
Our baseline equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium with three firms from section 6.1. Then,
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we compute an equilibrium in which each firm’s bandwidth holdings are 33.3% higher. Finally,
we compute an equilibrium in which each firm’s bandwidth holdings are the same as in the
baseline, but there are four firms. Thus, we consider two different ways of increasing the total
amount of spectrum in the industry by 33.3%.
Figure 13 illustrates how various endogenous variables change with the additional bandwidth.
Unsurprisingly, introducing a new firm leads to lower prices than increasing bandwidth per
firm. However, download speeds benefit considerably more when bandwdith per firm is in-
creased.























































































Figure 14 considers the overall effects on welfare and present an interesting tension. Increasing
the number of firms is better for consumer surplus, but increasing bandwidth-per-firm is better
for total surplus.






























































Figure 15 shows that consumers disagree on which way of allocating new bandwidth is better.
Most consumers prefer the situation with four firms, but high-income consumers prefer higher
31
bandwidth per firm.














































































































The regulation of the mobile telecommunications industry, including antitrust policy and
spectrum allocation, call for an understanding of scale efficiencies as well as market power.
Our approach has effectively been an interdisciplinary one, drawing from tools in empirical
industrial organization to understand market power, and from wireless engineering to under-
stand scale efficiencies. Our simulations show how our framework can shed light on many
issues related to industry structure, including the optimal number of firms, across-industry
spectrum allocation, and within-industry spectrum allocation.
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To calculate the interference from neighboring cells, we consider the six cells adjacent to a
particular cell, pictured in Figure 16. For a given point in the center cell, we compute the
distances between that point and the centroids of the adjacent cells, which is the location of
the antennas corresponding to each cell.




The signal power from each of the adjacent cells is the path loss (equation 4) implied by the
distance between the given point and the cell’s centroid. To determine the overall interference
power, we follow Blaszczyszyn, Jovanovicy and Karray (2014) and set interference power to
30% of the signal power from the six adjacent cells and sum over the cells.
A.2 Contraction Mapping
Here we consider an alternative version of the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (BLP)
contraction mapping. We observe market shares at the product-market level for Orange
products but only aggregate firm-level market shares for the other products. We first show
that if we observe market shares at the firm-market level, the problem can be rewritten in
such a way that the BLP contraction mapping proof holds. We then show that if we observe
some firm market shares only at the aggregate level (as is our case), the problem no longer
fits into the BLP proof setup, but that the standard function used to recover mean utilities
is still a contraction mapping.
A.2.1 Standard BLP contraction mapping setup
We will start with the standard BLP setting in order to introduce notation.
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For the standard BLP setting, with products j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J}, we observe market shares
ςjm for each product.
We can express an individual’s utility for a product as follows:
uijm = δjm + µijm + εijm,
and the type-specific market shares are as follows:
sijm =





The contraction mapping takes for granted the distribution over the heterogeneous component
of preferences F (µm). That is, given a conjectured parameter value θ, we have F (µ), and we
want to use the contraction mapping to recover mean utilities δjm.
Specifically, aggregate market shares are
sjm (δ) =





The existence of the contraction mapping implies that there is a unique vector δ such that
sm (δ) = ςm for any observed vector of shares sm.
A.2.2 Grouped products extension
Our setting is one in which market shares are observed only for certain groupings of products.
That is, let J be partitioned into subsets Jf with f ∈ F = {1, 2, . . . F}. For each f , we
observe only the market share ςft for all the products within Jf .
The subsets Jf may include individual products (i.e., in our application each Orange product
would have its own Jf set), or several products (i.e., each non-Orange firm has one Jf group
that includes all that firm’s products).
Providing a parametric form:
δjm = θ1xjm + ξjm,
where θ1 would capture what is often referred to as “linear parameters”; i.e., parameters that
can typically be estimated outside of the contraction mapping because they only shift the
mean utility component δjm that the contraction mapping aims to recover. In this extension,
the θ1 parameters must be included in the contraction mapping.
We definitely cannot recover δjm (or ξjm) separately for different j ∈ Jf . So, let’s assume
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ξjm = ξfm for all j ∈ Jf , and for each f .
Let x̄fm be the mean value of xfm for those products within Jf . Then, we have
δjm = θ1x̄fm + θ1xdjm + ξfm,
where xdjm := xjm − x̄fm.
Now, define
δ̃fm = θ1x̄fm + ξfm,
µ̃ijm = θ1xdjm + µijm.
This very nearly allows us to re-define the model in terms where we could apply the original
BLP proof strategy to establish the contraction mapping. The only problem is that µ̃ijm is
defined over j, where we would need it to be defined over f in order to apply the same proof






























































δ̃f ′m + µ̃if ′m
) .
We can then aggregate up to market-level shares sfm by integrating over the µ̃ifm, and we
have rewritten our extended setting in a way that allows us to apply the BLP proof strategy.
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A.2.3 Grouped products extension with nested logit
In the more general random coefficients nested logit (RCNL) model of ? (GV) used in our
demand model, the market share equations as well as the formulas for δ̃ and µ̃ no longer hold.
We can, however, construct analogous formulas that will allow us to recover firm-specific mean
demands δ̃.
In the RCNL model, an individual’s utility for a product is as follows:
uijm = δjm + µijm + ε̄ijm,
where
ε̄ijm = ζig(j)m + (1− σ) εijm,
where σ ∈ [0, 1) is the nesting parameter, the function g (j) returns the group identifier to
which j belongs, εijm is i.i.d. type-1 extreme value, and ζig(j) has the distribution such that
ε̄ijt is extreme value.




























































We will assume that products produced by the same firm belong to the same product group.
Formally, g (j) = g (j′) for all (j, j′) ∈ J 2f for all f . This assumption implies that the product-
relevant inclusive values {Iig}g∈G are common within firms, and we can write the product
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group identifier function g (·) as a function of the firm identifier rather than the product
identifier. In our context where all contracts belong to the same group, this assumption















































where Fg = {f ∈ F : g (f) = g}. This is now in terms of firm-specific variables.
Equation 20 is similar to that of GV, except in the numerator of the first fraction. GV note





























= σ1− σsf |g + sf ≥ 0 ⇔ σsf |g + (1− σ) sf ≥ 0.
This holds for all σ ∈ [0, 1), and so therefore iterating on the standard BLP contraction
mapping using Equation 20 will yield the unique vector δ̃.
26GV also note a few other conditions that must hold, but these conditions do not differ between our modified
setup and theirs, and so we therefore do not include them here.
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A.2.4 Market aggregation extension
The firm-aggregation provided in the previous sections still does not apply to our setting
because we observe market shares only at the aggregate level for certain firms. We can still
proceed by imposing the more restrictive assumption ξjm = ξf(j) for all j,m. This will allow
us to recover ξf for each f .
Analogous to the previous setup, let x̄f be the mean value of xjm across products j ∈ Jf and










δjm = θ1x̄f(j) + θ1xdjm + ξf(j),
where we now define xdjm := xjm − x̄f(j).
Define
δ̃f := θ1x̄f + ξf ,
µ̃ijm := θ1xdjm + µijm.













This is very similar to what we had in the previous section, except that here we have δ̃f
instead of δ̃fm because we are additionally averaging over markets.


























































δ̃′f + µ̃if ′m
) .













δ̃f ′ + µ̃if ′m
)dF (µ̃ifm), (21)
where we have normalized the utility of the outside option to 0.
We next need to show that the BLP contraction mapping holds in this case. Consider the
following BLP-style fixed point that gives the mean utilities δ̃ that set theoretical shares to
observed market shares ς̄:









The proof that f(·) is a contraction mapping closely follows that of BLP. In short, if we
recognize that averaging across markets is simply integrating over µ̃ijm in another dimension,
we can rewrite Equation 21 as follows:
s̄f =





δ̃f ′ + µ̃if ′m
)dG(µ̃ifm).
The BLP proof depends on the integrand, not the integral itself, so the proof holds for any
arbitrary distribution in an arbitrary number of dimensions. The full proof is provided below.
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) show that f : RK → RK in the metric space (R, d), where
d is the sup-norm, is a contraction mapping if











2. minj infx f(x) > −∞; and
3. there exists a value x̄ with the property that if for any j, xj ≥ x̄, then for some k,
fk(x) < xk.
We will now show that f(·) is a contraction mapping.
Proof. Beginning with (1), it is clear from the definition of s̄f (δ̃) that f(δ̃) is continuously
differentiable. The derivatives of f(δ̃) are as follows:
∂fj
∂δ̃j

























f ′ 6=f exp
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δ̃f ′′ + µ̃if ′′m
)]2 dF (µ̃ifm) for all g 6= f.
Note that ∂s̄f
∂δ̃g
(δ̃) is negative for all δ̃ ∈ RK , so ∂fj
∂δ̃k
(δ̃) is positive since s̄(δ̃)  0. Next note
that ∂fj
∂δ̃j




















δ̃f ′ + µ̃if ′t
)
,
we have that ∂s̄j
∂δ̃j




































Next we must show that show that f(·) satisfies Assumption (2). Note we can rewrite f(δ̃) as








δ̃f ′ + µ̃if ′m
)dF (µ̃)
 .










f  −∞, so we have satisfied (2).
Finally, we turn to (3). Following Berry (1994), consider a firm f . Set δ̃f ′ = −∞ for all
f ′ 6= f . Define ¯̃δf as the value that sets the market share of the outside good s̄0(δ̃) = ς̄0, the
observed market share. How do we know that such a ¯̃δf exists? Note that g(x) = 11+exp(x+µ)
maps from R into (0, 1) for any µ ∈ R, and ς̄0 ∈ (0, 1). Define ¯̃δ > maxf ¯̃δf . Consider δ̃ ∈ RK
such that for some f , δ̃f > ¯̃δ. From our definition of ¯̃δ, this will yield s̄0(δ̃) < ς̄0, and therefore∑
f s̄f (δ̃) >
∑
f
˜̄sf . In order for that inequality to hold, there must be some f such that
s̄f (δ̃) > ς̄f . Then ff (δ̃) < δ̃f , satisfying (3).
We therefore can iterate on the following
δ̃
(k)
f (θ1, θ2) = δ̃
(k−1)






f ; θ1, θ2
))
(23)
to obtain (approximately) the unique fixed point δ̃ that rationalizes the observed shares ς̃.
A.2.5 Implementation
The setup outlined in the above section is more restrictive than is necessary given our data. We
observe product-level market shares for every market for Orange products. We can therefore
allow ξjm to differ by product and market for all j ∈ JO, where O denotes Orange. This setup
is isomorphic to one in which we treat each (j,m)j∈JO,m∈M as a separate firm, so long as we
ensure that the set of “firms” differs across markets (because (j,m) will not be available in
(j,m′)).
To be more explicit, let f(j,m) give a unique identity for each (j,m)j∈JO,m∈M, but for a
non-Orange firm f ∈ F−O, f(j,m) = f(j′,m′) for all j, j′ ∈ Jf for all m,m′. Now let’s denote
the set of “firms” F ≡ {f(j,m) : j ∈ J ,m ∈M}.
In our predicted market share equation, we must be sure to include in the terms corresponding
to market m only the firms f ∈ F such that there exists j ∈ J such that f(j,m) = f . An
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Orange product-market f corresponding to market m will only show up in the denominator
of equation (21) in the mth term. This also holds for the numerator so that s̄f for an Orange
f is an average across markets only in a vacuous sense since there will only be one term.
To be explicit, in this case we will have “firm”-specific market weights:
wf (m) =

wf (m) if ∃j ∈ J−O : f(j,m) = f
1 if ∃j ∈ JO : f(j,m) = f
0 otherwise.
We can rewrite equation (21) as











δ̃f ′ + µ̃if ′m(θ1)
)dF (µ̃(θ1); θ2), (24)
where F(f) ≡ {f ′ ∈ F : M(f) ∩M(f ′) 6= ∅}, where M(f) = {m ∈ M : ∃j ∈
J such that f(j,m) = f}.27
A.3 Expectation Expressions







0 if ϑi ≤ θcQf(j)
ϑiQf(j)
θc











− 1 if ϑi ≥ θcQL (x̄j + 1) .
We will use this to derive analytic expressions for expected utility from data consumption and
predicted average data consumption, integrating over ϑi, which is distributed
ϑi ∼ Exponential (θdi) ,
27Note that in this setup, we have to make a few adjustments to the contraction mapping proof. First note
that ∂fk(x)
∂δ̃j
(δ̃) might be zero not positive, but that is still permissible under the sufficient conditions for the
contraction mapping. The partial derivatives will still sum to less than one. Thus, we still satisfy (1). This
setup doesn’t change the argument for (2). Finally, we must note the following for condition (3). Consider ¯̃δf .
In this setup, if f corresponds to an Orange (j,m), then δ̃f shows up in only one of the market-specific terms.
The function still maps from R to (0, 1), so we can still find a ¯̃δf . The rest of the argument holds, so therefore
(3) does as well, and we have a contraction mapping even in this setup with product-market-specific demand
shocks for Orange and firm-specific demand shocks for all other firms.
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meaning that the pdf of ϑi for an agent of type i is
fi (ϑi) =
θdie
−θdiϑi if ϑi ≥ 0
0 if ϑi < 0.
A.3.1 Expected utility from data consumption
We assume that consumers select plans knowing only their θdi type; their ϑi value is realized
after choosing a plan.
Their expected value of data consumption E [uj (x∗ (Q; θi) , Q)] is













































































− exp(−θdiθc/Q)θdiQ Q exp (θdiθc/Q) Ei (−θdiθc/Q)∫ θc(x̄j+1)/QL
θc(x̄j+1)/Q
(
ϑi log (1 + x̄j)− θc x̄jQ
)
dFi (ϑi)
























































θdiθc (x̄j + 1) /QL + 1
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log (x̄j + 1)
+QQL exp
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−θdiθc (x̄j + 1) /QL
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+ θdiQθc (x̄j + 1)
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A.3.2 Mean data consumption




































dFi (ϑi) = exp(−θdiϑi)θcθdi (θcθdi −Q (θdiϑi + 1))
∣∣∣θc(x̄j+1)/Q
ϑi=θc/Q
= exp(−θdiθc(x̄j+1)/Q)θcθdi (θcθdi −Q (θdiθc (x̄j + 1) /Q+ 1))
− exp(−θdiθc/Q)θcθdi (θcθdi −Q (θdiθc/Q+ 1))∫ θc(x̄j+1)/QL





−θdiθc (x̄j + 1) /QL
)








dFi (ϑi) = exp(−θdiϑi)θcθdi
(









θdiθc (x̄j + 1) /QL + 1
))
.
A.4 Demand Estimation Details
The moments listed in Section 5.1.3 are imposed only for Orange products. The MVNO demand shock
ξMVNO is normalized to 0, so the moments presented in Section 5.1.3 are not correctly specified if
Orange demand shocks differ from the MVNO demand shock. Therefore, we add an Orange dummy
variable Oj defined as follows
Oj =
{
1 if f(j) = Orange
0 otherwise,
and Oj enters utility additively so that Equation 11 becomes




+ θvvj − θpipj + θOOj + ξjm + εij .
The inclusion of the term θOOj allows Orange products to differ in a systematic way from the products
offered by other firms, restoring the validity of moments of the form presented in Section 5.1.3. To
identify the parameter θO, we impose the following additional moment
E [ξjm (θ)Oj ] = 0,
which is equivalent to imposing
E [ξjm (θ)] = 0,
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since the moments are only imposed for Orange products.
In addition to the parameterization in Equation 15, we make an additional transformation to ensure
the correct sign of θc. Let θm denote the model θ, presented in Section 4, and let θp denote the
parameter that we estimate. Equation 25 below provides the mapping between θp and θm.
θmc = exp (θpc ) . (25)
Incomes are in units of 10,000 AC. Data limits are in GB and quality measures are in GBps.28
B Supplementary Results
B.1 Demand Estimation Results
Demand parameter estimates are listed in table 3 for a range of imputed price elasticities and nesting
parameters.
To interpret the results above, the following tables convert the parameter estimates into willingness to
pay for certain contract characteristics across income percentiles. Each percentile corresponds to the
estimated willingness to pay for an individual with an income that is the average across all markets
of that percentile.29 Table 4 presents willingness to pay for an increase from a 1 000 MB plan to a
4 000 MB plan, with quality equal to the median data speed observed in our data (24.3 Mbps). Table
5 presents willingness to pay for a unlimited voice allowance. Finally, Table 6 presents willingness to
pay for an increase in data speeds from 10 Mbps to 20 Mbps on a 10 000 MB plan.
B.2 Cost Estimation Results
Tables 7 and 8 present per-user and per-tower cost estimates, respectively, for our imputed parameters.
Table 7 presents the estimated costs per-user, averaged across products with similar data limits. Table
8 presents estimated costs per-tower for each MNO, averaged across markets.
28Note that quality measures are in Gigabytes per second (GBps), not Gigabits per second (Gbps). This
conversion is needed so that the second term in Equation 13 has the interpretation of seconds spent downloading
data.
29Specifically, the 10th percentile is 3 759 AC, the 30th percentile is 8 705 AC, the 50th percentile is 13 015 AC,
the 70th percentile is 18 101 AC, and the 90th percentile is 28 096 AC.
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Table 3: Demand Parameter Estimates
Nesting
Elasticity Parameter θ̂p0 θ̂pz θ̂v θ̂O θ̂d0 θ̂dz θ̂c
−4.0 0.0 −0.119 −0.669 2.098 5.161 −1.759 0.315 −6.313
(0.461) (0.195) (0.093) (0.825) (0.112) (0.067) (0.097)
0.2 −0.341 −0.67 1.684 4.453 −1.532 0.314 −6.538
(0.461) (0.197) (0.077) (0.709) (0.106) (0.066) (0.107)
0.4 −0.627 −0.672 1.269 3.782 −1.239 0.312 −6.828
(0.461) (0.2) (0.069) (0.583) (0.098) (0.064) (0.118)
0.6 −1.031 −0.674 0.853 3.172 −0.826 0.31 −7.237
(0.471) (0.21) (0.071) (0.44) (0.091) (0.062) (0.133)
0.8 −1.721 −0.679 0.431 2.658 −0.124 0.308 −7.932
(0.585) (0.279) (0.086) (0.292) (0.087) (0.063) (0.174)
0.9 −1.22 −1.302 0.256 2.737 −0.064 0.707 −9.124
(0.729) (0.284) (0.034) (0.334) (0.131) (0.078) (0.044)
−2.5 0.0 −0.474 −0.804 1.562 3.447 −0.787 0.324 −7.283
(0.532) (0.248) (0.046) (0.587) (0.096) (0.067) (0.197)
0.2 −0.69 −0.809 1.256 3.117 −0.557 0.322 −7.511
(0.538) (0.254) (0.045) (0.518) (0.106) (0.066) (0.216)
0.4 −0.969 −0.815 0.949 2.819 −0.26 0.32 −7.804
(0.548) (0.264) (0.05) (0.437) (0.122) (0.063) (0.236)
0.6 −1.364 −0.822 0.639 2.566 0.156 0.318 −8.215
(0.59) (0.291) (0.062) (0.346) (0.143) (0.061) (0.26)
0.8 −2.045 −0.833 0.323 2.381 0.856 0.317 −8.912
(0.822) (0.426) (0.083) (0.255) (0.169) (0.069) (0.332)
0.9 −2.173 −1.142 0.182 2.437 1.738 0.335 −9.868
(1.203) (0.566) (0.068) (0.269) (0.09) (0.068) (0.165)
−1.8 0.0 −0.649 −0.949 1.324 2.743 0.514 0.326 −8.578
(0.641) (0.323) (0.031) (0.506) (0.497) (0.062) (0.633)
0.2 −0.859 −0.958 1.066 2.57 0.76 0.325 −8.821
(0.653) (0.333) (0.034) (0.454) (0.56) (0.061) (0.692)
0.4 −1.131 −0.969 0.806 2.425 1.074 0.323 −9.132
(0.673) (0.349) (0.042) (0.39) (0.624) (0.059) (0.751)
0.6 −1.519 −0.983 0.542 2.318 1.505 0.322 −9.56
(0.739) (0.391) (0.056) (0.318) (0.689) (0.059) (0.821)
0.8 −2.193 −1.0 0.274 2.267 2.217 0.322 −10.271
(1.057) (0.58) (0.078) (0.243) (0.816) (0.07) (0.996)
0.9 −1.694 −0.86 0.247 1.583 1.202 0.352 −9.722
(0.407) (0.166) (0.04) (0.2) (0.082) (0.046) (0.044)
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Table 4: Willingness to pay to go from 1 000 MB data plan to 4 000 MB plan
Nesting
Elasticity Parameter 10th %ile 30th %ile 50th %ile 70th %ile 90th %ile
−4.0 0.0 4.68 AC 5.26 AC 5.74 AC 6.27 AC 7.20 AC
0.2 4.66 AC 5.25 AC 5.72 AC 6.26 AC 7.21 AC
0.4 4.63 AC 5.22 AC 5.70 AC 6.25 AC 7.22 AC
0.6 4.59 AC 5.19 AC 5.68 AC 6.24 AC 7.25 AC
0.8 4.53 AC 5.15 AC 5.65 AC 6.23 AC 7.30 AC
0.9 3.53 AC 4.51 AC 5.38 AC 6.39 AC 7.91 AC
−2.5 0.0 2.63 AC 3.15 AC 3.61 AC 4.16 AC 5.31 AC
0.2 2.60 AC 3.12 AC 3.58 AC 4.15 AC 5.33 AC
0.4 2.56 AC 3.09 AC 3.55 AC 4.13 AC 5.36 AC
0.6 2.51 AC 3.05 AC 3.53 AC 4.12 AC 5.40 AC
0.8 2.47 AC 3.02 AC 3.51 AC 4.12 AC 5.47 AC
0.9 1.32 AC 1.87 AC 2.44 AC 3.28 AC 5.64 AC
−1.8 0.0 0.90 AC 1.15 AC 1.40 AC 1.72 AC 2.49 AC
0.2 0.87 AC 1.12 AC 1.36 AC 1.69 AC 2.47 AC
0.4 0.83 AC 1.09 AC 1.33 AC 1.66 AC 2.46 AC
0.6 0.80 AC 1.05 AC 1.30 AC 1.63 AC 2.45 AC
0.8 0.78 AC 1.03 AC 1.28 AC 1.61 AC 2.47 AC
0.9 1.40 AC 1.74 AC 2.05 AC 2.44 AC 3.36 AC
Table 5: Willingness to pay for unlimited voice allowance
Nesting
Elasticity Parameter 10th %ile 30th %ile 50th %ile 70th %ile 90th %ile
−4.0 0.0 2.98 AC 4.21 AC 5.53 AC 7.54 AC 13.87 AC
0.2 2.99 AC 4.21 AC 5.54 AC 7.56 AC 13.92 AC
0.4 3.00 AC 4.23 AC 5.57 AC 7.60 AC 14.02 AC
0.6 3.02 AC 4.27 AC 5.62 AC 7.68 AC 14.19 AC
0.8 3.05 AC 4.32 AC 5.70 AC 7.81 AC 14.49 AC
0.9 1.36 AC 2.65 AC 4.51 AC 8.25 AC 27.01 AC
−2.5 0.0 3.32 AC 5.01 AC 6.96 AC 10.10 AC 21.01 AC
0.2 3.32 AC 5.02 AC 6.98 AC 10.16 AC 21.23 AC
0.4 3.32 AC 5.04 AC 7.03 AC 10.25 AC 21.54 AC
0.6 3.33 AC 5.07 AC 7.09 AC 10.39 AC 21.98 AC
0.8 3.34 AC 5.12 AC 7.19 AC 10.58 AC 22.59 AC
0.9 2.38 AC 4.27 AC 6.80 AC 11.54 AC 32.68 AC
−1.8 0.0 3.52 AC 5.73 AC 8.44 AC 13.10 AC 31.10 AC
0.2 3.51 AC 5.74 AC 8.48 AC 13.22 AC 31.64 AC
0.4 3.50 AC 5.75 AC 8.54 AC 13.38 AC 32.36 AC
0.6 3.49 AC 5.77 AC 8.62 AC 13.60 AC 33.33 AC
0.8 3.48 AC 5.81 AC 8.74 AC 13.90 AC 34.58 AC
0.9 1.82 AC 2.82 AC 4.01 AC 5.97 AC 13.08 AC
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Table 6: Willingness to pay for increase from 10 Mbps to 20 Mbps
Nesting
Elasticity Parameter 10th %ile 30th %ile 50th %ile 70th %ile 90th %ile
−4.0 0.0 3.58 AC 4.34 AC 5.00 AC 5.81 AC 7.50 AC
0.2 3.57 AC 4.33 AC 4.99 AC 5.80 AC 7.50 AC
0.4 3.55 AC 4.31 AC 4.98 AC 5.79 AC 7.51 AC
0.6 3.52 AC 4.29 AC 4.96 AC 5.79 AC 7.54 AC
0.8 3.49 AC 4.26 AC 4.95 AC 5.79 AC 7.59 AC
0.9 1.49 AC 2.44 AC 3.47 AC 4.89 AC 7.98 AC
−2.5 0.0 2.02 AC 2.61 AC 3.16 AC 3.89 AC 5.59 AC
0.2 2.00 AC 2.59 AC 3.14 AC 3.87 AC 5.60 AC
0.4 1.97 AC 2.56 AC 3.12 AC 3.86 AC 5.63 AC
0.6 1.94 AC 2.53 AC 3.10 AC 3.85 AC 5.67 AC
0.8 1.91 AC 2.51 AC 3.08 AC 3.85 AC 5.74 AC
0.9 0.98 AC 1.51 AC 2.10 AC 3.02 AC 5.86 AC
−1.8 0.0 0.69 AC 0.96 AC 1.23 AC 1.61 AC 2.63 AC
0.2 0.67 AC 0.93 AC 1.20 AC 1.58 AC 2.61 AC
0.4 0.64 AC 0.90 AC 1.17 AC 1.55 AC 2.60 AC
0.6 0.62 AC 0.88 AC 1.14 AC 1.53 AC 2.59 AC
0.8 0.60 AC 0.86 AC 1.13 AC 1.52 AC 2.61 AC
0.9 0.85 AC 1.17 AC 1.48 AC 1.92 AC 3.03 AC
Table 7: Per-user cost estimates
Nesting d̄ < 1 000 1 000 ≤ d̄ < 5 000 d̄ ≥ 5 000
Parameter (in AC) (in AC) (in AC)
0.0 5.73 10.59 19.60
(0.71) (0.66) (1.99)
0.2 5.72 10.61 19.54
(0.68) (0.67) (2.00)
0.4 5.73 10.63 19.46
(0.66) (0.69) (2.07)
0.6 5.75 10.67 19.36
(0.69) (0.75) (2.33)
0.8 5.79 10.73 19.29
(0.99) (1.08) (3.67)
0.9 6.28 10.93 16.40
(1.24) (1.24) (5.94)
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Table 8: Per-base station cost estimates
Nesting Orange SFR Free Bouygues
Parameter (in AC) (in AC) (in AC) (in AC)
0.0 232 657 206 252 71 304 251 975
(73 847) (95 960) (28 771) (155 123)
0.2 231 880 203 534 67 950 250 726
(73 631) (94 736) (27 368) (154 606)
0.4 231 008 200 251 64 136 249 254
(73 388) (93 217) (25 797) (153 897)
0.6 230 114 196 488 59 981 247 600
(73 136) (91 405) (24 125) (152 855)
0.8 229 322 192 661 55 860 245 890
(72 893) (89 427) (22 529) (151 175)
0.9 195 111 122 377 12 168 208 161
(64 651) (59 614) (5 221) (137 559)
We estimate base station costs using using monthly profits. To recover the cost of long-lived base stations, we
assume the static game is infinitely repeated with a monthly discount rate of 0.5%. The above results are
therefore 11−0.995 = 200 times the per-base station costs we recover. Values in parentheses are standard
deviations of the distribution of estimated costs across markets (not standard errors in the estimates).
B.3 Counterfactual Nesting Parameter Imputations
Figure 17: Counterfactual prices and qualities










d = 1 000 MB plan prices










d = 10 000 MB plan prices







































Figure 18: Full and partial price elasticities









d = 1 000 MB plan
1 2 3 4 5 6
number of firms
d = 10 000 MB plan
Nesting Parameters
0.0 partial
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Figure 19: Counterfactual welfare



































Figure 20: Counterfactual welfare by income level























































Figure 21: Bandwidth derivatives















































































This appendix describes the French telecom industry, the main datasets and variables, and the con-
struction of the statistical inputs. It is organized into five sections. Section C.1 presents the scope
of the study as well as some background information about market structure and network sharing
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Table 9: Counterfactual Endogenous Variables
Nesting No. 1 000 MB plan 10 000 MB plan
Parameter Firms prices (in AC) prices (in AC) investment (in km) download speeds (in Mbps)
0.0 1 26.274 (3.935) 36.834 (1.803) 1.336 (0.033) 26.358 (1.374)
2 15.858 (0.657) 26.843 (1.661) 1.084 (0.051) 16.469 (1.456)
3 14.416 (0.833) 26.540 (1.451) 1.082 (0.071) 11.208 (1.159)
4 13.893 (0.790) 26.807 (1.342) 1.095 (0.078) 8.630 (0.900)
5 13.627 (0.742) 27.088 (1.306) 1.116 (0.082) 7.052 (0.734)
6 13.467 (0.704) 27.312 (1.304) 1.145 (0.086) 5.960 (0.620)
0.2 1 28.669 (4.232) 38.873 (2.323) 1.327 (0.035) 26.656 (1.427)
2 16.014 (1.064) 26.813 (1.667) 1.076 (0.058) 16.631 (1.590)
3 14.493 (0.960) 26.479 (1.385) 1.077 (0.070) 11.264 (1.139)
4 13.939 (0.842) 26.749 (1.270) 1.092 (0.074) 8.651 (0.861)
5 13.658 (0.770) 27.035 (1.235) 1.115 (0.077) 7.059 (0.698)
6 13.489 (0.723) 27.263 (1.233) 1.145 (0.081) 5.958 (0.591)
0.4 1 32.915 (4.755) 42.640 (3.004) 1.316 (0.036) 27.081 (1.497)
2 16.259 (1.446) 26.787 (1.770) 1.064 (0.062) 16.868 (1.694)
3 14.591 (1.068) 26.402 (1.387) 1.071 (0.068) 11.328 (1.107)
4 13.994 (0.896) 26.678 (1.255) 1.089 (0.071) 8.671 (0.826)
5 13.695 (0.808) 26.971 (1.214) 1.114 (0.074) 7.061 (0.671)
6 13.516 (0.755) 27.204 (1.209) 1.146 (0.078) 5.952 (0.573)
0.6 1 41.876 (2 779.363) 50.959 (36.964) 1.298 (2.377) 27.713 (154.239)
2 16.586 (1.845) 26.777 (2.141) 1.049 (0.068) 17.176 (1.855)
3 14.703 (1.219) 26.325 (1.594) 1.066 (0.071) 11.395 (1.143)
4 14.058 (0.998) 26.608 (1.420) 1.087 (0.074) 8.685 (0.855)
5 13.739 (0.892) 26.910 (1.361) 1.114 (0.078) 7.056 (0.703)
6 13.550 (0.830) 27.149 (1.347) 1.149 (0.084) 5.939 (0.607)
0.8 1 69.865 (25.670) 78.079 (16.409) 1.273 (0.633) 28.700 (36.740)
2 16.920 (2.788) 26.818 (3.730) 1.034 (0.095) 17.489 (2.695)
3 14.817 (1.745) 26.297 (2.728) 1.061 (0.104) 11.449 (1.652)
4 14.129 (1.406) 26.589 (2.397) 1.087 (0.112) 8.690 (1.254)
5 13.793 (1.245) 26.900 (2.265) 1.116 (0.122) 7.044 (1.046)
6 13.595 (1.152) 27.145 (2.216) 1.152 (0.134) 5.918 (0.916)
0.9 1 164.573 (142.166) 156.377 (37.408) 1.124 (0.854) 37.094 (55.900)
2 15.198 (3.473) 24.273 (7.468) 1.087 (0.119) 16.206 (3.273)
3 13.630 (2.358) 24.353 (6.075) 1.127 (0.157) 10.544 (2.294)
4 13.121 (1.985) 24.848 (5.536) 1.165 (0.193) 7.934 (1.876)
5 12.871 (1.801) 25.235 (5.291) 1.209 (0.233) 6.369 (1.644)
6 12.722 (1.693) 25.499 (5.192) 1.262 (0.281) 5.297 (1.493)
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Table 10: Price Elasticities
Nesting No. 1 000 MB plan 1 000 MB plan 10 000 MB plan 10 000 MB plan
Parameter Firms partial elasticity full elasticity partial elasticity full elasticity
0.0 1 −1.401 (0.063) −1.406 (0.063) −1.151 (0.067) −1.100 (0.051)
2 −2.161 (0.308) −2.159 (0.308) −2.332 (0.232) −2.072 (0.241)
3 −2.464 (0.424) −2.457 (0.421) −2.748 (0.316) −2.294 (0.361)
4 −2.628 (0.481) −2.616 (0.476) −2.944 (0.354) −2.352 (0.410)
5 −2.732 (0.519) −2.715 (0.511) −3.056 (0.376) −2.379 (0.428)
6 −2.804 (0.547) −2.783 (0.537) −3.128 (0.389) −2.408 (0.432)
0.2 1 −1.376 (0.065) −1.382 (0.064) −1.130 (0.082) −1.080 (0.065)
2 −2.176 (0.342) −2.174 (0.341) −2.338 (0.280) −2.078 (0.299)
3 −2.481 (0.445) −2.474 (0.442) −2.749 (0.344) −2.300 (0.390)
4 −2.644 (0.502) −2.631 (0.496) −2.939 (0.376) −2.356 (0.425)
5 −2.746 (0.539) −2.729 (0.531) −3.047 (0.395) −2.382 (0.437)
6 −2.816 (0.567) −2.795 (0.556) −3.118 (0.407) −2.411 (0.437)
0.4 1 −1.341 (0.065) −1.350 (0.063) −1.095 (0.094) −1.049 (0.078)
2 −2.196 (0.367) −2.193 (0.366) −2.349 (0.324) −2.090 (0.348)
3 −2.504 (0.471) −2.496 (0.468) −2.749 (0.376) −2.305 (0.416)
4 −2.665 (0.529) −2.653 (0.523) −2.931 (0.405) −2.358 (0.442)
5 −2.765 (0.567) −2.748 (0.558) −3.036 (0.424) −2.383 (0.448)
6 −2.834 (0.593) −2.812 (0.582) −3.104 (0.436) −2.411 (0.446)
0.6 1 −1.293 (42.743) −1.306 (7 806.238) −1.041 (1.495) −1.000 (1.735)
2 −2.224 (0.408) −2.220 (0.407) −2.363 (0.376) −2.105 (0.401)
3 −2.535 (0.527) −2.526 (0.523) −2.746 (0.434) −2.307 (0.463)
4 −2.694 (0.590) −2.681 (0.583) −2.920 (0.468) −2.355 (0.483)
5 −2.792 (0.628) −2.774 (0.619) −3.020 (0.490) −2.378 (0.485)
6 −2.859 (0.655) −2.836 (0.642) −3.086 (0.503) −2.406 (0.479)
0.8 1 −1.226 (1.971) −1.243 (2.086) −0.963 (0.737) −0.929 (0.822)
2 −2.257 (0.588) −2.253 (0.586) −2.374 (0.540) −2.114 (0.580)
3 −2.571 (0.759) −2.563 (0.753) −2.739 (0.658) −2.299 (0.683)
4 −2.730 (0.844) −2.717 (0.833) −2.905 (0.723) −2.339 (0.710)
5 −2.827 (0.894) −2.809 (0.880) −3.001 (0.761) −2.359 (0.707)
6 −2.893 (0.929) −2.870 (0.910) −3.064 (0.786) −2.387 (0.695)
0.9 1 −0.512 (4.702) −0.504 (4.929) −1.151 (0.071) −1.150 (0.033)
2 −2.711 (1.337) −2.705 (1.330) −1.946 (0.418) −1.717 (0.434)
3 −3.157 (1.688) −3.145 (1.673) −2.240 (0.563) −1.873 (0.556)
4 −3.380 (1.862) −3.360 (1.836) −2.371 (0.639) −1.922 (0.602)
5 −3.516 (1.969) −3.487 (1.932) −2.447 (0.681) −1.959 (0.611)
6 −3.607 (2.041) −3.571 (1.995) −2.498 (0.706) −2.001 (0.603)
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Parameter Firms (in 0.01 AC / person / MHz) (in 0.01 AC / person / MHz) (in 0.01 AC / person / MHz)
0.0 1 0.294 (0.105) 0.294 (0.105) 0.332 (0.061)
2 0.441 (0.190) −0.156 (0.028) 0.968 (0.092)
3 0.532 (0.208) −0.127 (0.011) 1.375 (0.040)
4 0.541 (0.213) −0.118 (0.007) 1.934 (0.130)
5 0.531 (0.208) −0.130 (0.012) 2.569 (0.282)
6 0.511 (0.193) −0.151 (0.020) 3.228 (0.448)
0.2 1 0.294 (0.109) 0.294 (0.109) 0.363 (0.040)
2 0.439 (0.200) −0.156 (0.023) 0.988 (0.062)
3 0.529 (0.221) −0.125 (0.022) 1.393 (0.065)
4 0.538 (0.214) −0.116 (0.018) 1.954 (0.205)
5 0.527 (0.208) −0.127 (0.021) 2.589 (0.369)
6 0.506 (0.194) −0.149 (0.028) 3.249 (0.546)
0.4 1 0.293 (0.112) 0.293 (0.112) 0.396 (0.032)
2 0.437 (0.204) −0.160 (0.039) 1.021 (0.046)
3 0.524 (0.225) −0.124 (0.034) 1.428 (0.113)
4 0.532 (0.217) −0.114 (0.026) 1.989 (0.265)
5 0.521 (0.209) −0.125 (0.028) 2.627 (0.442)
6 0.500 (0.193) −0.146 (0.035) 3.287 (0.634)
0.6 1 0.294 (65 844.771) 0.294 (65 844.771) 0.429 (30 663.048)
2 0.434 (0.210) −0.168 (0.055) 1.071 (0.050)
3 0.519 (0.233) −0.123 (0.040) 1.478 (0.128)
4 0.526 (0.226) −0.112 (0.030) 2.044 (0.295)
5 0.514 (0.216) −0.123 (0.031) 2.686 (0.488)
6 0.493 (0.211) −0.144 (0.038) 3.350 (0.700)
0.8 1 0.295 (1.317) 0.295 (1.317) 0.456 (2.252)
2 0.432 (0.252) −0.177 (0.054) 1.127 (0.184)
3 0.513 (0.284) −0.123 (0.038) 1.543 (0.056)
4 0.519 (0.257) −0.110 (0.028) 2.118 (0.242)
5 0.506 (0.263) −0.120 (0.030) 2.770 (0.489)
6 0.484 (0.251) −0.141 (0.038) 3.441 (0.762)
0.9 1 0.444 (0.202) 0.444 (0.202) 1.143 (0.227)
2 0.289 (0.133) −0.144 (0.034) 1.215 (0.476)
3 0.346 (0.165) −0.104 (0.018) 1.546 (0.288)
4 0.351 (0.170) −0.096 (0.016) 1.997 (0.147)
5 0.341 (0.174) −0.106 (0.014) 2.500 (0.111)




Parameter Firms Consumer Surplus Producer Surplus Total Surplus
0.0 1 - - -
2 6.151 (0.923) −3.002 (0.326) 3.149 (0.686)
3 6.966 (0.882) −3.745 (0.344) 3.221 (0.722)
4 7.131 (0.820) −4.023 (0.368) 3.108 (0.735)
5 7.115 (0.789) −4.150 (0.393) 2.964 (0.754)
6 7.031 (0.777) −4.207 (0.413) 2.824 (0.776)
0.2 1 - - -
2 7.796 (1.096) −3.764 (0.351) 4.033 (0.861)
3 8.761 (0.910) −4.607 (0.383) 4.154 (0.827)
4 8.990 (0.817) −4.920 (0.438) 4.070 (0.815)
5 9.009 (0.780) −5.063 (0.476) 3.946 (0.822)
6 8.949 (0.767) −5.128 (0.498) 3.821 (0.838)
0.4 1 - - -
2 10.784 (1.228) −5.197 (0.382) 5.587 (1.093)
3 11.981 (0.918) −6.201 (0.526) 5.780 (0.984)
4 12.294 (0.818) −6.560 (0.614) 5.734 (0.948)
5 12.359 (0.782) −6.722 (0.658) 5.637 (0.943)
6 12.329 (0.769) −6.798 (0.680) 5.532 (0.952)
0.6 1 - - -
2 17.378 (22.012) −8.488 (19.269) 8.890 (2.867)
3 18.891 (21.453) −9.722 (18.903) 9.169 (2.675)
4 19.304 (21.270) −10.136 (18.782) 9.168 (2.614)
5 19.425 (21.200) −10.321 (18.728) 9.104 (2.598)
6 19.433 (21.178) −10.408 (18.704) 9.026 (2.600)
0.8 1 - - -
2 39.067 (3.576) −19.688 (3.018) 19.379 (2.268)
3 40.911 (3.217) −21.184 (3.151) 19.728 (1.904)
4 41.429 (3.158) −21.656 (3.217) 19.773 (1.784)
5 41.612 (3.144) −21.865 (3.253) 19.747 (1.741)
6 41.667 (3.141) −21.966 (3.274) 19.702 (1.728)
0.9 1 - - -
2 84.959 (10.434) −39.303 (10.697) 45.655 (1.960)
3 86.349 (11.767) −40.523 (11.607) 45.826 (1.809)
4 86.738 (12.237) −40.898 (11.915) 45.841 (1.780)
5 86.886 (12.469) −41.062 (12.068) 45.825 (1.770)
6 86.944 (12.600) −41.139 (12.157) 45.804 (1.763)
Welfare is defined in comparison to the monopoly case and therefore is not provided for the case of one firm.
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Table 13: Consumer Surplus by Income Level
Nesting No.
Parameter Firms 10 %ile 30 %ile 50 %ile 70 %ile 90 %ile
0.0 1 - - - - -
2 −1.019 (0.538) 2.715 (4.719) 8.880 (1.165) 10.292 (4.604) 8.690 (3.794)
3 −1.071 (0.979) 4.075 (4.633) 10.195 (1.482) 11.209 (4.939) 8.439 (3.716)
4 −1.045 (1.646) 4.490 (4.657) 10.563 (1.527) 11.386 (5.010) 7.937 (3.610)
5 −1.063 (1.966) 4.618 (4.667) 10.656 (1.542) 11.365 (5.043) 7.480 (3.541)
6 −1.110 (2.133) 4.632 (4.660) 10.639 (1.556) 11.270 (5.068) 7.090 (3.499)
0.2 1 - - - - -
2 −1.017 (0.536) 4.000 (4.742) 10.645 (1.482) 12.653 (5.282) 11.194 (4.466)
3 −0.682 (2.049) 5.480 (4.881) 12.072 (1.580) 13.676 (5.388) 11.029 (4.212)
4 −0.509 (2.606) 5.947 (4.980) 12.496 (1.561) 13.905 (5.393) 10.567 (4.051)
5 −0.453 (2.849) 6.106 (5.015) 12.623 (1.554) 13.917 (5.403) 10.137 (3.959)
6 −0.457 (2.964) 6.140 (5.017) 12.628 (1.560) 13.844 (5.420) 9.765 (3.906)
0.4 1 - - - - -
2 −0.550 (2.128) 6.310 (5.082) 13.829 (1.805) 16.737 (6.131) 15.692 (5.413)
3 0.311 (3.504) 7.995 (5.446) 15.443 (1.689) 17.938 (6.010) 15.687 (4.959)
4 0.650 (3.939) 8.532 (5.598) 15.941 (1.626) 18.241 (5.967) 15.296 (4.744)
5 0.783 (4.108) 8.728 (5.651) 16.109 (1.605) 18.296 (5.961) 14.912 (4.628)
6 0.825 (4.176) 8.786 (5.659) 16.143 (1.605) 18.253 (5.972) 14.575 (4.561)
0.6 1 - - - - -
2 1.498 (5.087) 11.464 (4.870) 20.848 (17.252) 25.336 (42.161) 25.272 (67.802)
3 3.018 (6.285) 13.442 (5.440) 22.719 (16.904) 26.780 (41.837) 25.511 (67.108)
4 3.529 (6.624) 14.062 (5.640) 23.303 (16.786) 27.174 (41.749) 25.232 (66.817)
5 3.737 (6.741) 14.299 (5.712) 23.519 (16.747) 27.284 (41.726) 24.926 (66.660)
6 3.821 (6.777) 14.384 (5.730) 23.585 (16.741) 27.282 (41.727) 24.650 (66.565)
0.8 1 - - - - -
2 10.887 (16.183) 28.771 (15.323) 43.950 (4.911) 52.627 (18.322) 55.331 (20.366)
3 13.037 (17.536) 31.067 (16.293) 46.091 (4.391) 54.327 (17.579) 55.876 (19.119)
4 13.688 (17.916) 31.767 (16.619) 46.760 (4.242) 54.818 (17.371) 55.758 (18.638)
5 13.955 (18.045) 32.045 (16.747) 47.026 (4.185) 54.993 (17.294) 55.578 (18.394)
6 14.073 (18.081) 32.157 (16.794) 47.129 (4.163) 55.042 (17.266) 55.408 (18.257)
0.9 1 - - - - -
2 16.205 (24.896) 43.637 (40.019) 86.219 (41.013) 129.853 (19.400) 146.078 (50.149)
3 17.841 (26.204) 45.416 (41.305) 87.995 (42.175) 131.203 (18.092) 146.043 (47.977)
4 18.344 (26.604) 45.948 (41.743) 88.560 (42.571) 131.623 (17.663) 145.756 (47.060)
5 18.566 (26.778) 46.169 (41.947) 88.797 (42.771) 131.794 (17.452) 145.533 (46.564)
6 18.679 (26.863) 46.268 (42.053) 88.900 (42.887) 131.861 (17.326) 145.377 (46.278)
Welfare is defined in comparison to the monopoly case and therefore is not provided for the case of one firm.
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Table 14: Impact of Adding Additional Firm on Endogenous Variables
Nesting ∆ 1 000 MB plan ∆ 10 000 MB plan ∆ investment ∆ download
Parameter Market prices (in AC) prices (in AC) (in km) speeds (in Mbps)
0.0 3 firms, 43b 0.306 (0.045) −0.324 (0.091) −0.062 (0.008) 4.975 (0.539)
4 firms, b 0.850 (0.276) 0.745 (0.153) −0.041 (0.006) 0.701 (0.050)
0.2 3 firms, 43b 0.234 (0.038) −0.400 (0.145) −0.058 (0.005) 4.929 (0.579)
4 firms, b 0.877 (0.255) 0.771 (0.128) −0.036 (0.005) 0.638 (0.048)
0.4 3 firms, 43b 0.147 (0.028) −0.495 (0.179) −0.052 (0.003) 4.869 (0.612)
4 firms, b 0.907 (0.223) 0.800 (0.090) −0.029 (0.003) 0.556 (0.057)
0.6 3 firms, 43b 0.052 (0.021) −0.599 (0.217) −0.046 (0.002) 4.795 (0.648)
4 firms, b 0.936 (0.197) 0.827 (0.048) −0.021 (0.001) 0.460 (0.067)
0.8 3 firms, 43b −0.038 (0.047) −0.697 (0.346) −0.040 (0.005) 4.705 (0.786)
4 firms, b 0.957 (0.247) 0.849 (0.074) −0.012 (0.002) 0.355 (0.050)
0.9 3 firms, 43b −0.041 (0.033) −0.531 (0.384) −0.045 (0.042) 4.312 (0.458)
4 firms, b 0.780 (0.506) 0.847 (0.078) −0.010 (0.010) 0.282 (0.058)
Table 15: Impact of Adding Additional Firm on Welfare
Nesting
Parameter Market ∆ CS ∆ PS ∆ TS
0.0 3 firms, 43b 7.909 (0.627) 8.431 (1.302) 16.340 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 8.144 (0.571) 8.055 (1.162) 16.199 (0.686)
0.2 3 firms, 43b 8.407 (0.850) 9.312 (1.339) 17.719 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 8.687 (0.753) 8.909 (1.198) 17.595 (0.861)
0.4 3 firms, 43b 9.283 (1.295) 10.920 (1.479) 20.203 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 9.618 (1.170) 10.486 (1.351) 20.103 (1.093)
0.6 3 firms, 43b 11.152 (19.248) 14.445 (17.866) 25.597 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 11.550 (19.402) 13.976 (17.986) 25.526 (2.867)
0.8 3 firms, 43b 17.181 (4.647) 25.899 (3.844) 43.079 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 17.648 (4.421) 25.394 (3.734) 43.042 (2.268)
0.9 3 firms, 43b 37.165 (14.712) 44.418 (13.843) 81.583 (< 0.001)
4 firms, b 37.520 (14.223) 44.011 (13.536) 81.530 (1.960)
Table 16: Impact of Adding Additional Firm on Consumer Surplus by Income Level
Nesting ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Parameter Market 10 %ile 30 %ile 50 %ile 70 %ile 90 %ile
0.0 3 firms, 43b −0.054 (0.217) −0.877 (1.646) −0.838 (3.230) 7.956 (4.316) 45.739 (13.015)
4 firms, b 0.016 (0.619) −0.342 (1.594) −0.358 (3.190) 8.207 (4.247) 45.161 (12.880)
0.2 3 firms, 43b −0.061 (0.246) −1.075 (1.765) −0.929 (3.264) 8.232 (4.362) 49.378 (15.085)
4 firms, b 0.169 (0.411) −0.515 (1.653) −0.420 (3.286) 8.512 (4.341) 48.825 (14.919)
0.4 3 firms, 43b −0.066 (0.429) −1.410 (1.926) −1.110 (3.444) 8.816 (4.459) 55.628 (18.733)
4 firms, b 0.323 (0.076) −0.817 (1.776) −0.565 (3.506) 9.138 (4.470) 55.125 (18.536)
0.6 3 firms, 43b −0.126 (1.082) −2.106 (0.699) −1.527 (19.697) 10.268 (39.704) 68.667 (36.306)
4 firms, b 0.405 (0.761) −1.474 (0.563) −0.937 (19.794) 10.647 (39.750) 68.251 (36.531)
0.8 3 firms, 43b −0.550 (3.504) −4.273 (3.588) −2.861 (11.336) 15.439 (13.662) 109.880 (60.829)
4 firms, b 0.080 (3.173) −3.603 (3.301) −2.224 (11.519) 15.885 (13.807) 109.606 (60.321)
0.9 3 firms, 43b 0.146 (0.011) −1.566 (9.465) −10.017 (11.705) 9.607 (29.647) 279.919 (144.013)
4 firms, b 0.640 (0.374) −1.053 (9.058) −9.478 (11.323) 10.004 (30.083) 279.489 (142.949)
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in the French mobile industry. Section C.2 presents the characteristics of mobile tariffs and the tar-
iff dataset. Section C.3 describes the Orange customers dataset and socio-economic characteristics.
Section C.4 describes the measurement of the quality of mobile data. Finally, section C.5 presents




The French telecommunications market includes both fixed and mobile services. Fixed services cover
fixed telephony, internet, and television over the internet, and generate slightly more than half of
operators’ total revenue. Mobile services include voice, data, and short messages services (SMS) and
generated 44 percent of total telecommunications revenues in 2015.30 We focus on mobile services.
Mobile services are supplied using network technology that improves regularly. Each improvement
corresponds to a generation of mobile network technology. In our year of study, 2015, French MNOs
had largely already deployed 4G technology, especially in the urban areas we consider.
The penetration rate of mobile services reached 110% in 2015 (see figure 22). According to surveys
conducted by the French research institute CREDOC, mobile users represent 92% of the population
above 12 years old in 2015. We rely on the statistics from these surveys in order to determine the
market size. A decomposition according to the technology shows that mobile data is less popular than
voice, particularly 4G mobile data whose penetration rate was 34% in 2015.
In terms of usage, figure 23 shows that voice and SMS consumption has reached a plateau since 2011.
There is roughly no more growth in the number of minutes consumed, which stabilizes around 3 hours
per consumer per month. The monthly number of SMS per consumer stays around 250 since 2011.
The picture looks quite different for mobile data consumption. As shown in figure 23, the average
monthly consumption of data has been growing so far. The volume of monthly data rises from 100
MB in 2010 to 800 MB in 2015.
Mobile services are typically purchased under two types of contracts, postpaid and prepaid, and by
two types of customers, residential and business. Postpaid contracts require the subscriber to pay a
monthly fee for a certain allowance of mobile services, and they may or may not involve a multi-month
commitment in the contract. In contrast, prepaid contracts require consumers to pay as they consume
and do not involve long-term commitments. Postpaid contracts represent a large majority of the mobile
market, 83% as of December 2015.31
Unlike residential customers, business customers can bargain over their contracts and, therefore, exert
some buyer power. Residential customers represent 89% of the mobile market in 2015.32 We focus
only on the market for residential contracts.
30Source: ARCEP, Series Chronologiques Trimestrielles, April 2016.
31Source: ARCEP, Series Chronologiques Trimestrielles, April 2016.
32Source: ARCEP, Series Chronologiques Trimestrielles, April 2016.
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Figure 22: Penetration rate (ARCEP)
Note: Ratio of the number of active SIM cards (postpaid and prepaid excluding MtoM) to the population
size.
Source: Own computations using data released by the regulator (ARCEP) - Series Chronologiques
Trimestrielles (April 2016). Population data provided by INSEE.
Figure 23: Monthly usage of voice, SMS and data per subscriber
Note: Monthly usage is estimated as quarterly volume divided by 3. This monthly volume is divided by the
number of active SIM cards (postpaid and prepaid excluding MtoM) at the end of the quarter.




During the period we study, the French mobile industry comprised four mobile network operators
(MNO): Orange (ORG), SFR-Numericable (SFR), Bouygues Telecom (BYT) and Free Mobile (FREE).
FREE entered the market in January 2012 and experienced a sharp increase in market share, up to 16%
in four years (see figure 24). Right before FREE’s entry, the three incumbents operators introduced
their own low-cost brands: SOSH for ORG, RED for SFR and B&YOU for BYT. Contracts sold under
these brands are postpaid without commitment.
MNOs own their networks contrary to mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) who typically rent
access to MNOs’ networks. Providing network access to MVNO is mandatory and enforced by regula-
tion, but the access charge is freely negotiated with the MNO. According to figures from the national
regulator ARCEP, there are more than 30 MVNOs in France in 2015, representing 10.6% of the mobile
market, hosted by ORG, SFR and BYT.
On top of hosting MVNOs, MNOs also share their network infrastructure, particularly in less dense
areas. The next section presents the features of network sharing among MNOs.
Figure 24: Evolution of postpaid residential market shares
Source: World Cellular Information Services (Ovum).
C.1.3 Network sharing
Network sharing occurs when a network operator shares a part or the whole of its network resources
with a retail competitor. These resources can be passive network elements, such as antenna supports,
masts, or active network elements, such as frequency bandwidths. Passive network sharing affects
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coverage differentiation but not necessarily quality differentiation. It typically consists of operators
sharing the same tower or the cost of electricity. In general, it is any agreement between MNOs that
do not involve the sharing of available frequency bandwidths.
In contrast, under active network sharing (Radio Access Network-Sharing), operators cannot differ-
entiate in terms of quality, defined as the frequency bandwidth available per customer. Typically, it
consists of the sharing of frequency bands and core network elements. Roaming agreements, whereby
an operator’s customers rely on the network of a host operator to communicate, is the highest level of
active network sharing. It does not offer any possibility for quality or coverage differentiation.
Table 17 below presents the network sharing agreements reached between 2012 and 2015. These
agreements apply to two types of areas according to their population density. “White Areas” or
“Zones Blanches” correspond to areas where population density is so low that network deployment by
several operators is not profitable. They are identified by the regulator on the basis of criteria which
can change. These areas are typically rural, and represent roughly 1% of the population and 10% of
the national surface. Only ORG, SFR and BYT have invested in these areas.
The most widespread network technologies in the White Areas are 2G, EDGE and GPRS. 33 However,
3G technology has been recently deployed. As of the end of December 2015, half of ORG and BYT’s
networks in these areas were covered by 3G, compared to 35% for SFR. In general, only one operator
invests in a given White Area, and 64% of antennas in these areas are involved in a roaming agreement.
Rival operators roam over the network of the only operator which invests in the area. As a result,
there is no quality differentiation. For the remaining 36% of antennas, operators share passive network
elements.
At the national level, FREE’s customers can roam over ORG’s 2G and 3G networks as long as there
is no FREE antenna nearby. As a result, FREE cannot differentiate from ORG on 2G and 3G
technologies, except when a FREE antenna is nearby its customer. In addition, FREE does not have
access to networks in ZBs where BYT or SFR is the leader. MVNOs have roaming agreements with
their hosts and therefore cannot differentiate in terms of quality or coverage.
Our model focuses on high-density areas to avoid the need to explicitly model network sharing.
33EDGE and GPRS are suitable for low speed mobile data services.
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Table 17: Network sharing agreements 2012-2015
FREE ORG SFR BYT
Zone Blanche Roaming: 64% of 2G & 3G antenna ↔
Passive sharing: 36% of antenna ↔
Low Density 2G and 3G RAN-Sharing 7 7 ↔
4G Roaming 7 7 →
High Density 7 7 7 7
National Passive sharing ↔
2G and 3G Roaming → 7 7
Source: Summary from discussions with ORG’s experts (HOSPITAL Jean-Jacques).
Note: ↔: two-way (reciprocal) sharing, A→ B one-way sharing hosted by operator B.
C.2 Tariff data
C.2.1 Characteristics of Mobile Contracts
Mobile operators offer a variety of contracts that rely on voice and data services that can be bundled
with fixed telephony, fixed broadband or television. A typical mobile contract comprises a fixed price
(prepaid or postpaid) for given allowances (data, voice and SMS), prices per unit above allowances,
commitment duration and handset subsidy.
Mobile contracts typically involve a fixed price for a given allowance, and may involve charges per
unit for usage above allowances. Such extra charges are typically associated with plans with small
allowances. Some contracts include unlimited SMS and voice allowances, and for contracts with large
data allowances, further consumption may be blocked or throttled as consumers hit the limit of their
data allowance. In these cases, customers willing to continue data consumption beyond their allowance
have to purchase add-ons as one-shot data packages, valid until the end of the contract, or recurrent
data packages with a price discount.
For contracts with a data throttling limit, the download speed is reduced for usage above allowance if
no add-on is purchased. The maximal download speed under throttling is typically 128 Kbps. With
this download speed, it would take over half and hour to download a 30 MB file, compared to 2 minutes
under a theoretical unthrottled speed of 2 Mbps in a 3G network, and 24 seconds given a moderate
4G download speed of 10 Mbps. Basically, only emails and light web pages can be opened under
throttling. As presented in table 18 below, this download speed is not always specified by operators in
their contracts. When it is, it may depend on the location of the usage (local or abroad). The actual
download speed experienced by customers is function of the number of simultaneous users, its location
and handset. In our demand model, however, we assume that any data consumption over the data
limit yields a speed of exactly 128 Kbps.
Mobile tariffs may include a discount for multi-month commitments, a premium for handset subsidy
and additional discounts for purchasing fixed or television services on top of mobile services. Customers
under commitment can terminate their contracts pursuant to a 2008 act labeled “Loi Chatel.” Accord-
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ing to this act, customers that have been under commitment for more than 12 months can terminate
their contract by paying a penalty equal to the quarter of the bill over the remaining commitment
period. If the customer has spent less than 12 months, she has to pay the whole remaining bill until
the twelfth month, and the quarter of the remaining.
There is no penalty for changing contract with the same brand. However, customers switching between
two brands of the same operator may incur a penalty if they were initially under commitment. This is
typically the case for ORG’s customers switching from standard ORG contracts to the low-cost brand
SOSH. Operators introduced contracts without commitment in 2011. FREE does not offer long term
commitment contracts, nor handset subsidy.







ns ≡ not specified.
Source: operators’ contracts
C.2.2 Tariff dataset
We collected data on contracts released between November 2013 and October 2015 along with their
characteristics. It includes postpaid contracts from the four MNOs and the largest MVNO (EI Telecom)
as well as their prepaid contracts.34 Promotional contracts, typically released during summer and
Christmas, are not included in the dataset.
Characteristics of contracts have been retrieved from operators’ quarterly catalogues. Contract char-
acteristics include tariff, voice and data limits, price per unit of consumption above allowance, inter-
national voice or data roaming, handset subsidy, length of commitment, bundling with fixed services.
C.3 Customer data
C.3.1 Choice and usage data
Contract choice and usage data come from ORG’s customer database. We therefore only observe
choice and usage data for ORG and not customers of the other firms, an issue we address in Section 5.
This database contains observations of all postpaid residential customer choices and data/voice usage
34ORG’s contracts include not only those that are sold through its main brand, but also others sold under
alternative brands such as SOSH, BNP Paribas Mobile, FNAC Mobile, Click Mobile, Carrefour Mobile, etc.
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in October 2015. Customers can cancel, keep, renew or choose a new contract with ORG. Table 19
presents the number of subscribers according to their status.
Table 19: Number of subscribers
Subscribers cancel (%) keep (%) renew (%) new (%) Total (%)
14 992 631 0.9 94.5 3.6 1.1 100
The contract data contain information on the contract and handset characteristics,35 as well as cus-
tomer characteristics, including the residence of the customer, which we use to construct market shares.
Usage data include SMS, voice, and data consumption.
C.3.2 Socio-economic data
Socio-economic characteristics are generated from the 2011’s population census conducted by the
French office of statistics (INSEE). These statistics include the deciles of income at municipality level.
Income is measured as the fiscal revenue of households living in a given municipality in 2011.
C.4 Quality data
Quality measures are constructed using download speed test results provided by Ookla. Test results
come from users who use Ookla’s free Internet speed test, called simply “Speedtest,” using a web
browser or within an app. Using speed tests in France in the fourth quarter of 2015 yields 1 056 285
individual speed tests. Each speed test records the download speed, mobile network operator, and the
user’s location. We aggregate speed tests by averaging measured download speeds over tests for a given
operator and geographic market, yielding an operator-market quality measure. An operator-market
quality measure is, on average, an average of 284 test results.
C.5 Statistical inputs
This section presents the main statistical inputs of the estimation procedure: market characteristics
and the choice set.
C.5.1 Market characteristics
This section starts with the definition of markets, and then presents the construction of market size
and income distribution within markets. A market is defined as the geographical level at which quality
measures can be reliable. Specifically, we need a market definition that yields sufficient speed tests
to construct accurate measures of quality. As a result, we define market as either a large (urban)
municipality, that is with more than 10 000 inhabitants. This definition collapses the initial 36 664
municipalities into 592 markets, and we discard three of these markets due to insufficient speed test
results for at least one operator in the market.
35In some cases, information on prices, voice and data limits is not consistent with our data from tariffs
catalogues. We change these characteristics to be in line with those from tariffs catalogues.
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Market size is defined as the population above 12 years old using mobile communications. Table 20
reports the share of mobile users in the population above age 12 according the size of their municipalities
of residence. Monthly population size is estimated using the geometric mean of the annual population
growth rates obtained from INSEE population data.
Income distribution within markets was presented in section C.3.2. This distribution corresponds to
income per capita in 2011.
Table 20: Share of mobile users among population above 12
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
< 2 000 inhab. 82 85 85 86 91
2 000 - 20 000 inhab. 83 85 87 84 89
20 - 100 000 inhab. 81 89 87 90 91
> 100 000 inhab. 87 89 90 92 93
Paris 88 91 94 92 96
France 84 89 89 89 92
Source: CREDOC Surveys
C.5.2 Choice set
We use tariff data presented in section C.2.2 to construct the choice set which includes the postpaid
contracts of each MNO, the postpaid contracts of the largest MVNO (El Telecom), or the outside
option of not using mobile communications.
Table 21 presents the market shares of the alternatives in the choice set during our sample period.
Contracts included in the choice set are available in all markets; however, quality differs across markets.
We construct market-specific choice sets by adding the quality data measured in each market. Quality
of postpaid MVNO offers is estimated as the simple average of the quality of the hosts (BYT, ORG
and SFR).
Table 21: Aggregate market shares of alternatives (%)
Alternatives
market size (millions) ORG SFR BYT FREE MVNO Prepaid Non-users Total
56.5 26.7 20.9 11.7 12.4 13.0 7.2 8.0 100
As noted previously, the choice set would consist of more than 1 700 alternatives if we included all
contracts listed in the tariffs catalog, making the demand estimation cumbersome. We overcome
this hurdle by focusing on data limits as the most important attribute. Indeed, recent investment in
mobile networks in France are primarily made in order to improve the supply of mobile data services.
Therefore, we employ a size reduction strategy that removes the less relevant contract’s components
and focus on the most significant variation in data limits.
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Specifically, we define categories of contracts according to their level of data limits: less than 500 MB,
500–3 000 MB, 3 000–7 000 MB and more than 7 000 MB. These thresholds have been chosen following
discussions with the industry experts and the statistical distribution of chosen contracts. The second
data limit category—that is, contracts with 500–3 000 MB—have been further split according to their
voice allowance: unlimited or not, making a total of five categories of contracts. Low data limit
contracts typically do not have unlimited voice, and high data limit contracts typically come with
unlimited voice allowance, so we do not split these categories by the voice limit.
Next, we exclude contracts bundled with fixed broadband or television, as they generally come with
their mobile standalone version. We then choose the least expensive contract per category as the
category’s representative contract. Some customers keep old contracts that are no longer available, so
we fill these missing data by using the most chosen old contracts within the same category. While some
contracts with handset subsidies have corresponding standalone versions, some do not. We adjust the
prices of these latter contracts using data on the price of handsets and the upfront cost required by
Orange. These data were collected for both iPhone and Samsung, the two most popular handsets. We
then distribute the handset cost over 24 months, and update the monthly contract price by subtracting
off the monthly cost of the handset. In addition, we assume that Orange’s handset subsidies apply to
other operators because we do not observed their upfront costs.
C.5.3 Mean data consumption
We use the Orange customer data presented in section C.3.1 to construct market-level measures of mean
data consumption for each Orange contract. Note that because we only observe data consumption
for consumers of Orange contracts, we cannot construct these measures for contracts of other firms.
Contracts are aggregated based on the associated data limit and whether or not the voice allowance
is unlimited, as detailed in section C.5.2. Constructing market-contract-level measures of mean data
consumption is complicated by the fact that the aggregated contracts in the choice set incorporate
contracts with different data limits. For example, the Orange 4 000 MB data limit contract in the
choice set incorporates contracts in the customer data with data limits ranging from 3 000 MB to 7 000
MB.
Since we use the mean data consumption in the data to discipline the predicted data consumption in
our demand model, which is based on the data limit from the choice set, simply averaging the data
consumption observed in the customer data can lead to biased estimates in the data consumption
coefficients. For example, using the same 4 000 MB aggregated contract as before, if many customers
in this category have contracts with data limits above 4 000 MB, they may consume well above 4 000
MB without hitting their data limit. Simply averaging data consumption for this category might give
mean data consumption above 4 000 MB, which our demand estimation would interpret as either being
insensitive to download speeds (because they are willing to consume even at the very slow throttled
speed) or heavily weight the amount of data consumed (because they are consuming large amounts
of data despite the slow throttled speed). In fact, it might be that neither of those conclusions is
consistent with consumers’ data consumption decisions under their actual data limit.
In order to account for the fact that realized data consumption decisions reflect heterogeneous data
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x̄j + max {0, xi − x̄i} ,
where Ij is the set of consumers with contracts that aggregate to j, xi is consumer i’s data consumption,
and x̄i is her data limit. The value x̄j is the data limit associated with the aggregate contract j. We
separate these two terms rather than simply using the fraction of the data limit consumed times the
aggregated contract’s data limit because, conditional on bypassing the data limit, the data limit is
irrelevant for further data consumption.
36For contracts belonging to the group characterized by data limits of less than 500 MB, we impose that
consumption cannot be greater than the data limit. For this category of contracts, add-on data packages are
a common way of increasing one’s data limit. Since we do not observe data package purchases, we simply
assume that any consumer that consumed above the data limit did so with a purchased data package and that
without one, he would have consumed as much as the data limit allowed. Our demand model reflects this,
imposing that contracts in this category cannot consume above the data limit at a reduced speed (as they are





cu cost per user
cfc,m cost per base station at zero bandwidth
cbw cost per base station per unit of bandwidth operated
D mass of consumers per unit area that are downloading
f indexes firms
F used for CDFs





pj price of contract j
Q channel capacity (Mbits/second)
q data transmission speed as function of distance
Q download speed (Mbits/second)
QL throttled download speed
QD demand requests (Mbits/second)
r distance from antenna (km)
R radius of area served by one base station (km)
sj market share
s vector of market shares
u utility from data consumption over course of month
v utility of a contract
x monthly data consumption
γm data transmission efficiency in market m




θp0 parameter controlling the mean of the price coefficient
θpz parameter controlling the heterogeneity in the price coefficient
θv coefficient on dummy for unlimited voice
θO coefficient on dummy for Orange products
θc opportunity cost of time spent downloading data coefficient
θdi parameter of log-normal distribution that defines distribution
from which a consumer’s utility of data consumption is drawn
θd0 parameter controlling the mean of θdi
θdz parameter controlling the heterogeneity in θdi
ϑi random shock to consumer’s utility of data consumption,
distributed exponentially with parameter θdi
ξjm market-level demand shock
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